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ABSTRACT
Motivated by recent attention given to the independent
auditor's role in detecting red flags,
investigates

the

effect

of

time

this dissertation

pressure

on

auditors'

attention to red flags in the auditing environment.

In so

doing, the earlier work of McDaniel [1990] investigating the
effects of time pressure on the auditor's ability to execute
auditing tests of details is extended.
indicating

that

red

flag

Authoritative sources

detection is performed

as

a

subsidiary task in a multi-task auditing environment are
presented.

The Easterbrook hypothesis, which holds that a

progressive

reduction

in

the

range of cue

utilization

accompanies increases in arousal, provides theoretical support
for

the

prediction

that

under

time

pressure

attention will become more

focused on the

executing

of

auditing

tests

details at the

auditors'

primary taskof
expense

of

attention given to the subsidiary task of red flag detection.
McDaniel's [1990] test instrument was modified by seeding
red

flags

within

the

text

hypothetical audit client.

and

data

associated

with

a

This instrument was administered

to practicing independent auditors at varying levels of time
pressure.

Results

consistent

with

the

theoretical

expectations are presented. The results suggest that auditors
under high time pressure may be less likely to attend to and
understand red flags than auditors under low time pressure.

ix
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Furthermore,

the

results

suggest

that

the

performance

decrements associated with the red flag detection task may be
observed at a lower level of time pressure than decrements in
the

accuracy

with

which

auditing

tests

of

details

executed.

x
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CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION
Purpose of the Research
The purpose of this research is to investigate the effect
of time pressure on the cognitive processes of auditors.
Specifically, this dissertation compares the extent to which
auditors under differing conditions of time pressure are able
to attend to red flags1 while executing detailed tests related
to a client's inventory system.

The belief that auditors have

a responsibility for detecting and investigating red flags
that they are not meeting motivates this research. [National
Commission on Fraudulent Financial Reporting, 1987, p. 25]
Building upon McDaniel [1990], a study that demonstrated
the effects of time pressure on the execution of audit tests
1 The term "red flags" is a colloquialism which refers
to what auditing standards call "factors influencing audit
risk." [AICPA 1992, AU 316.09]
In the absence of a formal
definition of the term, there is some variability in its
application and interpretation. Conditions within an entity
which allow irregularities to occur, factors which motivate
individuals to commit irregularities, and attitudes or ethical
standards which may predispose individuals to engage in
irregularities are generally recognized classifications of red
flags. Indicators present in accounting data such as unusual
trends, sizes or relationships between amounts may also be red
flags. The presence of a red flag does not necessarily mean
that a financial fraud has occurred. It simply means that the
characteristic has appeared in post-mortems of known financial
frauds and should be treated with skepticism.
Failure to
detect a red flag is not necessarily the same thing as a
failure to detect a fraud. If no fraud is present, one would
not necessarily expect an auditor to comment on the presence
of a red flag. This study addresses the ability of auditors
to detect and investigate red flags in an audit setting in
which the presence of several red flags, when considered in
aggregate, indicates that there is a high probability that
financial fraud is present.
1
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2

of details in a single-task setting, the proposed research
examines time pressure's effects on both the primary cognitive
task of executing detailed audit tests and the subsidiary
cognitive task of being attentive to the red flags.

This

research demonstrates that the task of attending to red flags
is, to a large extent, executed in such a dual cognitive task2
environment.

Throughout, I rely upon research in psychology

to explain and predict the effects of time pressure on auditor
performance.

Results are, on the whole, supportive of the

predictions made.
Overview
Auditors are engaged to render opinions on financial
statements taken as a whole, and they do so through gathering
sufficient, competent evidential matter that bears upon the
reasonableness of managerial assertions contained within those
statements.
the

absence

Such reasonableness is understood as, primarily,
of

material

misstatement

of

the

financial

statements taken as a whole.
Two

corollaries

of

this

overriding

objective,

the

rendering of an opinion, are: (1) the possible discovery of
errors, irregularities, and even illegal acts; and, (2) the
design of audit procedures that assist in such possible
discoveries as well as the formation of an opinion on the

2 The concept of dual cognitive tasks or dual task
environment is unrelated to the auditing concept of dual
purpose testing discussed in auditing literature [AICPA, 1992,
AU 350.44].
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3

financial

statements.3

The AICPA Professional

Standards

require attention to each of these corollaries:
The auditor's assessment of the risk of material
misstatement of the financial statements requires the
auditor to understand the characteristics of errors and
irregularities . . . and the complex interaction of those
characteristics.
Based on that understanding, the
auditor designs and performs appropriate audit procedures
and evaluates the results [AICPA 1992, AU 316.06;
emphasis added!.
Along with going concern problems, auditor interest in
errors and irregularities have become popularly known as "red
flags" that follow from audit procedures.

It seems that

auditors are engaged in multiple tasks simultaneously; that
is, while the expression of

an

opinion onthe financial

statements remains the focus

of

the audit, auditors are

obligated to keep other goals

and

objectives, like red flag

3 Auditing standards define errors as "unintentional
misstatements or omissions of amounts or disclosures in
financial statements" [AICPA, 1992, AU 316.02, emphasis in
original].
With regard to irregularities, the following
guidance is given:
The
term
irregularities
refers
to
intentional
misstatements or omissions of amounts or disclosures in
financial statements. Irregularities include fraudulent
financial reporting undertaken to render financial
statements misleading, sometimes called management fraud,
and misappropriation of assets,
sometimes called
defalcations. [AICPA, 1992, AU 316.03 emphasis in
original]
In either case the auditor's responsibility for detection is
extended only to situations where the error or irregularity is
material. Materiality is defined as follows, "the magnitude
of an omission or misstatement of accounting information that,
in light of surrounding circumstances, makes it probable that
the judgment of a reasonable person relying on the information
would have been changed or influenced by the omission or
misstatement." [AICPA, 1992, AU 312.06].
All subsequent
discussion of errors and irregularities assumes materiality.
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detection, in mind as they perform the procedures necessary to
support the audit opinion.
This

is not to say that red flag detection occurs

exclusively in a dual cognitive task environment.
audit

procedures

specifically

concerned

There are

with

errors,

irregularities such as financial fraud or defalcation.

Host

often, however, the objective of these procedures is to assess
the likelihood that these situations exist and adjust audit
tests of details accordingly.

For example, senior members of

an audit team may undertake specific procedures to determine
the various exposure areas in the audit.

These exposure areas

may be communicated to other audit team members through
discussions, an audit planning memo, or audit program changes.
It

is

generally

only

through

testing

the

details

of

transactions and balances, which may or may not be done by
senior audit team members, that determinations as to whether
errors or irregularities have occurred can be made, however.4
In this general case, the auditor responsible for executing
the tests of details would be advised to keep in mind the red
flags

identified

and

communicated previously

and

to

attentive to additional indicators present in the data.

be
Put

4 The example presented here was a general case. There
may be individual cases where the specific procedures aimed at
assessing the likelihood of each of the various situations
provide strong evidence that an error or irregularity exists.
In such an event a directed investigation of the matter may be
undertaken
to
gather
evidence
exclusively
for
the
identification of an error or irregularity such as financial
fraud or defalcation.
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cryptically,

audit

procedures

serve

several

different

modalities of audit judgment and decision.
Audit activity is made more difficult when one recognizes
that audit effort is a scarce resource.

Most obviously, audit

firms exist primarily to make a profit, and that profit-focus
gives

rise to time budgets placed

upon

auditors.

For

practical and theoretical reasons that will be explained
subsequently, such budgets may cause auditors to subordinate
red flag detection —

a task not directly associated with

these audit procedures —

to tasks for which the time budget

holds them directly accountable.

Substantive tests of details

of balances would be one example of these latter tasks.

In

the language of cognitive psychology, auditing seems to be a
"dual-task” paradigm where substantive tests of details would
be considered primary cognitive tasks while red flag detection
would be considered a secondary cognitive task.
The purpose of this dissertation is to investigate how
increasing levels of time pressure mediate the performance of
these two types of audit tasks.

While others have studied the

effect of time pressure on the performance of a single audit
task, this study is to my knowledge the first to investigate
the effect of time pressure on multiple audit tasks [Rhode,
1978;

Alderman and Deitrick,

1982;

Lightner,

Adams,

and

Lightner, 1982; Lightner, Leisenring, and Winters, 1983; Cook
and Kelly, 1988; and Kelly and Margheim, 1990; Waggoner and
Cashell, 1991].

In addition, McDaniel [1990] has established
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that time pressure influences the efficiency and effectiveness
of auditors.

The theoretical expectation (discussed and

rationalized subsequently)

is that at some level of time

pressure that places auditors beyond the optimal level of
arousal

(or

stress),

time

pressure

will

have

a

more

detrimental effect on red flag detection than it will on the
execution of substantive tests.
This theoretical expectation is a special case of a more
general psychological finding that high levels of arousal
force the range of attention toward primary tasks and away
from secondary tasks [Eysenck, 1982; Kahneman, 1973].

At a

practical level, conditioned by the increased competitiveness
of the audit market, this psychological effect may explain why
some have claimed that auditors have failed with regard to
identifying and pursuing red flags related to financial fraud
and other irregularities [National Commission on Fraudulent
Financial Reporting, 1987; Public Oversight Board of the SEC
Practice Section, AICPA,

1993; Board of Directors of the

American Institute of Certified Public Accountants, 1993].
That is, if increased competitiveness gives rise to more time
pressure; and, if such time pressure results in less attention
to secondary tasks, then there may be a psychological reason
for "failures'* with respect to red flag detection.
Outline of Dissertation
In

the

institutional

remainder
issues

of
that

the

chapter,

motivate

this

I

discuss

the

dissertation.
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Following that,

I discuss the theoretical arguments that

motivate an interest in the relation between dual-tasks and
arousal.

Chapter

III

explains the methods

of

inquiry.

Analysis of the data and discussion of the results is detailed
in Chapter IV.

Chapter V concludes the dissertation with

discussion of the implications of the study for auditors and
audit institutions.
Motivation
Prominent researchers in cognitive accounting research
have suggested that the field lacks an understanding of the
context in which decisions are made [Hogarth, 1991; Ashton,
1990; Johnson and Kaplan, 1991; Ashton, Kleinmutz, Sullivan,
and Thomassini, 1988].

As such, they have recommended that

future research in the area take into consideration more
features of the decision-making environment.
Presumably, the purpose of cognitive research in auditing
is to 1) advance the understanding of how auditors perform
judgment and choice tasks, 2) provide some measurement of how
well

they perform these tasks,

and

3)

suggest ways of

improving performance [Hogarth 1991].

Hogarth advises that,

although

have

researchers

in

the

area

made

important

contributions toward the attainment of each of these three
goals, the degree to which they can be achieved is limited
without
operate.

considering

the

conditions

under

which

auditors

Although such considerations would be inappropriate
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for a less developed area of study, they are necessary for
progress in more established disciplines:
In the final analysis, however, audits take place in a
larger and more complex context than those portrayed in
most CRA [cognitive research in auditing] studies. It is
my belief that CRA is now mature enough to consider the
complexities of that context. [Hogarth, 1991, p. 288]
Ashton et al. [1988, p. 104] along with Dopuch [1992] and Lord
[1992] make a similar claim:
While some attention has been devoted to cognitive issues
outside of the input-output paradigm (e.g., memory and
information search), the existing research largely has
ignored the group, organizational, professional, and
market contexts within which many audit decisions are
made, including issues related to incentives, learning,
feedback, and competition.
This study, as with McDaniel [1990], makes the market
context of time pressure on auditors experimentally salient
and

is

thus

responsive

to

such

claims

and

appeals.

Interestingly, Hogarth [1991, p. 288] identified time pressure
as an example of such a contextual factor —

"What,

for

example, are the effects of time pressure and/or the riskiness
of different types of audits?"

Although time pressure has

been found to have significant effects on the execution of
auditing procedures, Hogarth's comments indicate that little
is known about its effects on the cognitive processes of
auditors.

Cognitive processes are, of course, the object of

inquiry in cognitive accounting research.
Motivation
exclusively

from

for
the

this

dissertation

academic

does

community,

not

emanate

however.

The

motivating conditions are found in the practice of auditing
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itself.

Particularly, the relevance of the challenge facing

the profession to become more active in its role of detecting
red

flags

serves

as a primary motivating

factor.

The

significance of this challenge is evidenced by a recent
statement of the Board of Directors of the AICPA [1993, p. 2],
"The public looks to the independent auditor to detect fraud,
and it is the auditor's responsibility to do so."
While this is the view of the Board of Directors of the
AICPA, it may not be shared by everyone in the profession.
There are those who may claim that auditors are not and should
not be responsible for financial fraud detection.

They

generally point out that Statement on Auditing Standards (SAS)
No.

53 disclaims full responsibility for financial fraud

detection with statements emphasizing the audit concept of
reasonable rather than complete assurance.
made

that

financial

frauds

are

often

The argument is
complex

and

very

difficult for auditors to detect with standard procedures.
These

arguments,

while valid,

sections of SAS No.

53 that

do not account

for

other

identify several red flags

associated with errors and irregularities with the purpose of
encouraging

the

auditor

to

consider

them

designing, and executing audit procedures.

in

planning,

Clearly, auditing

standards indicate the importance of attending to red flags as
indicators of potential errors or

irregularities

in the

client's records. Recent statements of the Board of Directors
of the AICPA, the Public Oversight Board of the SEC Practice
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Section of the AICPA, the National Commission on Fraudulent
Financial Reporting and researchers who have proposed models
to improve auditor detection and interpretation of red flags
[Loebbecke, Eining, and Willingham, 1989] provide support for
the belief that auditors are responsible for the detection of
financial fraud.

External auditors'

role as independent

investigators perhaps makes them more responsible, at least in
theory, for the detection of financial fraud than internal
oversight functions. As functional units within many clients,
internal audit departments may not be charged with the mission
of detecting financial fraud.

Their focus may be more on the

detection

or

of

defalcations

embezzlements

operational concerns rather than financial fraud.

or

other

External

auditors, on the other hand, are responsible for executing
audit procedures that provide reasonable assurance as to
whether

the

misstatement.

financial

statements

are

free

of

material

Financial fraud is one situation that causes

financial statements to be materially misstated. Requirements
within SAS No. 53 clearly indicate that attention to red flags
that may signal misstatements due to errors, defalcations, or
financial fraud is a key element allowing audit procedures to
provide such assurance.

Although the standard states that

auditors are not guarantors of the financial statements, it is
clear that auditor responsibility is increased when red flags
are present.

For this reason, auditor attention to red flags.
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especially as they may be indicators of potential financial
fraud, is a significant issue facing the profession.
Also motivating this dissertation is the belief that
auditors have been deficient in their role as detectors of red
flags.

This belief has been expressed, either directly or

indirectly,

by several

different groups.

The

Board of

Directors of the AICPA [1993, p. 1] listed "Improving the
prevention and detection of fraud" first among the five key
areas

in which reforms were being pursued.

The Public

Oversight Board of the SEC practice section of the AICPA
[1993],

a

board

formed

to

oversee

the

quality

control

practices of the firms that audit publicly held companies,
recently

stated that there

auditors

are

detection

is a widespread

belief that

not meeting their responsibilities

of

financial

fraud.

They

for the

made

several

recommendations aimed at improving auditor performance in this
critical

area.

The

National

Commission

on

Fraudulent

Financial Reporting, or Treadway Commission, was charged with
the mission of identifying causal factors that can lead to
financial fraud and steps to reduce its incidence.

Although

this commission did indicate that audits play a significant
role in detecting financial fraud,
independent

accountants

can

and

its report added that

should

do

more.

Also

commenting on the auditor's role in fraud detection was a
comprehensive fraud survey conducted by a major accounting
firm.

In this survey, it was reported that only three percent

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

of the frauds commented upon by survey respondents were
detected by external auditors [Coogan and Carey,
10].5

1993, p.

These statements and findings, coupled with the fact

that, as of October, 1993, the accounting profession had been
named in lawsuits aggregating to $15 billion (many of which
have been filed for alleged failure to detect fraud during
audits)

[Wells et al., 1993] reinforce the perception that

auditors have been deficient in their role of detecting
indicators of potential financial fraud.
Given

that

this

issue

is an

important

one

to the

profession and that there are perceived deficiencies in the
current level at which auditors perform their role, it would
follow that there is a need for research investigating the
possible sources of these deficiencies.

Toward that end, the

Board of Directors of the AICPA [1993, p. 3] has called for a
research program to learn "... what audit procedures did detect
or might have detected the illegality and how audits can be
changed to prevent reoccurrence."

Although the Board called

for a case study approach, the research question is similar to
that addressed by this dissertation— why do auditors fail in
meeting expectations in the area of red flag detection.

This

dissertation addresses this research question by presenting
5 This finding may be qualified somewhat by the fact
that only one percent of the frauds commented upon in the
survey were identified as "false financial statements" [KPMG
Peat Marwick, 1993, p. 6]. Despite this qualification, the
finding has important implications for the auditor's cognitive
predisposition toward the detection of indicators of potential
financial fraud.
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and

analyzing

data

gathered

in

an

experiment

in which

practicing auditors are called upon to execute an auditing
task.

Before detailing the experimental task, however, the

theoretical foundation supporting this type of inquiry is
discussed.
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CHAPTER 2
THEORETICAL DEVELOPMENT
Overview
Having asserted that a perceived deficiency exists with
regard to auditors' performance in the arena of red flag
detection, this dissertation now focuses on sources of this
perceived deficiency.

It may be appropriate to consider

auditors' failure to detect red flags as a member of a class
of behaviors that the literature labels "dysfunctional" audit
behaviors.

Time pressure has been identified as a feature of

the auditing context that may lead to several dysfunctional
behaviors such as underreporting of audit hours, premature
signoff, and superficial review of client documents [Kelly and
Margheim,

1990].

The

following

discussion

surveys

the

research into the effects of time pressure on "dysfunctional"
auditor behaviors.
The

market

increased

the

context

in

importance

which
of

auditors

efficiency

effectiveness in auditing performance.
are

constrained

[Loebbecke

and

by

increasingly

Steinbart,

1987].

operate
as

well

has
as

As a result auditors

stringent
In

time

addition

budgets
to

the

constraints placed on the time allowed to carry out audit
procedures, the increase in the number of lawsuits filed
against auditors has demanded greater accountability for the
results of the procedures applied under time pressure [Lord
and

DeZoort,

1992].

When

these

demands

for

increased

14
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efficiency and increased effectiveness conflict, auditors are
likely to experience what Schuler [1980] terns demand stress.
Stress has been shown to produce certain cognitive responses
in individuals in which affective considerations displace
logical or empirical considerations in information processing
[Etzioni, 1988].

Among these responses is a reduction in the

range of cue utilization in attentional processes.
Put broadly, the institutional context of this study is
based upon the notion that both the economics of auditing and
the cognitive conditions that inform auditors give rise to a
predictable tendency to discount the relevance of secondary
tasks (e.g., red flag detection) as time pressure increases.
The remainder of this chapter reviews the literature that
discusses

the

economics

of

auditing

and

the

cognitive

conditions that are expected to be operationalized in the
auditing context.
Time Pressure and the Economics of Auditing
Both

competitive

bidding

for

audit

services

and

heightened attention to audit costs have become significant
factors in the market for auditing services, particularly
after the AICPA's Code of Professional Conduct was revised in
1972.

In response to the increased competition, auditors have

placed greater emphasis on time budgets and the discovery and
utilization

of

more

efficient

procedures

[Loebbecke and

Steinbart, 1987].
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The audit program plays an important role in defining the
procedures to be employed in the execution of an audit and in
allocating

budgeted

hours

to

various

audit

areas.

It

typically includes a list of the procedures, the timing of
tests, the sample sizes, and an indication of which items to
examine in order to carry out the audit within an acceptable
level of audit risk.

The audit program serves as a means of

directing the auditor's attention to the items relevant to the
testing of assertions associated with the various transaction
cycles and accounts in order to achieve audit objectives.
The possibility exists that audit procedures might not be
executed as required by the audit program.
increased nonsampling risk.

This can result in

Nonsampling risk refers to the

possibility that audit tests will fail to reveal exceptions
existing in an audit sample.

To the extent that the failure

to carry out tests as designed results in either inappropriate
procedures

being

executed

or

the

auditor's

failure

recognize an exception, nonsampling risk is increased.

to

Given

that increased nonsampling risk can result in significant
audit deficiencies, it would be appropriate to examine the
reasons why audit procedures are not executed as planned.
Although its effects are not always negative

[e.g.,

Waggoner and Cashell, 1991], time pressure has been identified
as a feature of the auditing environment that might result in
deviations from the audit program.

Audit firms impose time

budgets in an attempt to increase efficiency.

At appropriate
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levels time pressure can, indeed, increase processing speed
and reduce the amount of time spent attending to non-task
related cues [Ben Zur and Breznitz, 1981; Payne, Bettman, and
Johnson,

1988].

Researchers have attempted to ascertain

whether time pressure is being imposed at levels conducive to
increasing

the

efficiency

and

effectiveness

of

auditor

performance or at levels at which departures from the audit
program occur.

The following discussion highlights some of

those efforts.
Apparently, time pressure in auditing became an object of
research when Rhode [1978] surveyed 1,126 practicing auditors
and

400

retired

auditors

on

various

institutionalized context of auditing.

aspects

of

the

Over 48 percent of

respondents indicated increasing pressure to reduce hours
worked during the three previous years.

The same percentage

believed

quality

time

negatively.

pressure

impacts

the

audits

Twenty three percent admitted to having signed-

off on procedures without having performed them.
percent

of

believed

that

excessive

time

pressure

Thirty-one
motivates

auditors to sign-off prematurely.
Several researchers conducted follow-up studies [Alderman
and Deitrick, 1982; Lightner, Adams and Lightner, 1982; and
Lightner, Leisenring, and Winters, 1983]. Results essentially
confirmed Rhode's

findings.

For

example,

Alderman

and

Deitrick's [1982] study of Big Eight auditors found that 31
percent of seniors and 23 percent of staff believed that
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auditors

in

their

firm

had

prematurely

signed-off

on

procedures.
Lightner,

Adams,

and Lightner

[1982]

and

Lightner,

Leisenring, and Winters [1983] found that underreporting of
time worked was a consequence of time pressure.

Although the

underreporting of audit hours would not seem to reduce audit
quality as directly as a premature sign-off might,

some

consider that it does tend to produce long-run dysfunctions
for

the quality

of auditing

[Kelly and Margheim,

1990;

Waggoner and Cashell, 1991].
The studies mentioned above examined the effects of time
pressure on auditing tests and procedures.

Kelly and Margheim

[1990] studied the effect of time pressure on a wider range of
auditing phenomena.

In particular, they were concerned with

the effect of time pressure on the thoroughness of the audit
procedures

that

were

applied.

Twenty-five

percent

of

respondents reported that, as a consequence of time pressure,
they had performed somewhat superficial reviews of client
documents on their most recent audit.
Further evidence that time pressure is a significant
factor in the auditing environment comes from an internal
investigation of factors contributing to success in public
accounting performed by a major accounting firm.

The results

of this investigation, a survey of successful senior auditors,
indicated that the ability to handle stressful situations was
consistently rated as a very important factor for success in
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the profession.

In fact, in the rating of 122 potential

factors for success, four of the six most important factors
had to do with the ability to perform under conditions of time
pressure

(see Appendix A for a listing of the top-rated

factors).
It would appear, based on the findings reported in the
literature, that time pressure is a salient feature of the
auditing

environment that produces

several

dysfunctions.

Given that, the focus now turns to the issue of whether the
perceived deficiency in auditor attention to red flags is
another dysfunctional behavior that may be attributable, in
part, to time pressure.

This analysis begins by considering

the overall audit risk model as it relates to red flag
detection and time pressure.
Audit risk has been defined as "the risk that the
auditor may unknowingly fail to appropriately modify his
opinion

on

financial

statements

misstated." [AICPA, 1992, AU 312.02].

that

are

materially

Failure to detect red

flags is clearly and positively correlated with the likelihood
that financial statements may be materially misstated.

In

terms of the audit risk model, time pressure can affect the
nonsampling component of detection risk.

Nonsampling risk

exists because applying an audit procedure to all transactions
or balances may still result in a failure to detect a material
misstatement.

Nonsampling risk is increased in situations

where the audit procedures selected are not appropriate to
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obtain the specific objective or where auditors may fail to
recognize material misstatements in the documents that are
examined. McDaniel [1990] experimentally examined the effects
of time pressure on audit performance and found that increased
time

pressure

was

associated

with

decreased

accuracy and decreased sampling adequacy.

processing

Both of these

dysfunctional behaviors effectively increase nonsampling risk
and,

therefore,

increase audit risk.6

So,

although the

statements on auditing standards claim that, "[n]onsampling
risk can be reduced to a negligible level through such factors
as

adequate planning

and

supervision"

[AICPA,

1992,

AU

350.11], McDaniel's study indicates that time pressure is a
factor that works against such efforts.

Studies identifying

some of the dysfunctional effects of time pressure in the
auditing environment indicate that there is reason to believe
that more than a negligible level of nonsampling risk may
result.
The arousal produced when auditors perceive the allotted
time to be insufficient to execute procedures and judgments as
required by the audit program should produce what Schuler
[1980]

terms demand

stress.

Demand stress

arises when

decision makers perceive that they will not be able to
complete the task as initially required.

The psychology

6
As noted by McDaniel [1990], decreased sampling
adequacy is indicative of increased sampling risk. Decreased
sampling adequacy may also increase nonsampling risk in that
the procedure for selecting the sample (an audit procedure) is
inappropriate.
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literature has addressed the positive and negative effects of
arousing conditions such as demand stress.

The following

section

institutional

combines

this

literature with

the

context of time pressure in auditing in order to provide a
theoretical structure for the empirical inquiry described
here.
Responses to Stress
Demand stress induces several responses that may not
occur under less stressful conditions.

Holsti [1978, p. 44]

summarizes the findings with regard to the effects of stress
on individuals' information processing behavior:
[Stress leads to]... increased random behavior; increased
rate of error; regression to simple and more primitive
modes of response; problem solving rigidity; diminished
focus of attention, across both time and space; reduced
ability to discriminate the dangerous from the trivial;
diminished scope of complex perceptual activity; loss of
abstract ability; disorientation of visual motor
coordination... [T]olerance for ambiguity is reduced
under high stress. Under these conditions individuals
made decisions before adequate information was available,
with the result that they performed much less capably
than persons working under normal conditions.
Weick

[1983,

p.

355]

noted several similar responses to

stress— "People notice fewer details, they look for shorter
periods of time, and they assimilate novel perceptions to
events they have seen before.”

In addition, Weick indicated

that there is evidence that people revert to dominant, firstlearned patterns of response rather than those that were more
recently learned.
While the statements made by Holsti [1978] and Weick
[1983] identify a number of apparently disparate effects of
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stress, there may be an underlying concept that links them.
Several studies indicate that stress may impede the ability to
deal with complex or new issues.

Stress may thus cause

individuals to ignore anything that adds to their cognitive
burden.

This reductive effect may have serious implications

for auditors.

The nature of the auditor's role

is to

understand the complexities of the client's business and to
interpret detailed information in light of these complex
relationships.

If too much importance is placed upon the

accumulation of details without the necessary interpretation
of them in light of complexities, auditors may lose their
attitude of professional skepticism and become averse to
executing cognitively complex analyses.
The source of this limitation on the ability to execute
cognitively complex procedures may reside in individuals'
attentional processes.
responses

to

stress

Probably the most notable of all
are

detailed

hypothesis" and the "behavioral law."

in

the

"Easterbrook

Initially proposed by

Easterbrook [1959], the hypothesis that there is a progressive
reduction in the range of cue utilization that accompanies
increases in arousal (stress) has been confirmed in several
more recent studies (see Eysenck [1982] for a review of thirty
studies reporting such results).

In routine tasks where

attention to only a few cues is required, increased arousal
should increase performance on the task by reducing the extent
to which attention

is paid to extraneous

cues,

thereby
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increasing processing speed.

When arousal increases to the

point that the cues that are filtered out are crucial to the
performance of the task, performance decrements should be
observed.
By expressing the effects of arousal in terms of their
effects on attention, Easterbrook provided theoretical support
for the Yerkes-Dodson law [Yerkes and Dodson, 1908].

The

Yerkes-Dodson

the

law

describes

two

characteristics

relationship between arousal and performance.

of

First, it holds

that an inverted-U shaped relationship exists between arousal
and

performance;

intermediate,
assertion

that

is,

optimizing

is that

this

performance

level
optimal

of

is

best

arousal.

level of

at

The

some

second

arousal varies

inversely with the level of task complexity.

Thus peak

performance on complex tasks is presumed facilitated by low
levels of arousal, while peak performance on simple tasks is
facilitated

by

high

levels

of

arousal.

Easterbrook's

formulation of the effects of arousal on attention provides a
potential explanation of the inverse relationship between the
optimal level of arousal and task complexity as stated by the
Yerkes-Dodson law.

The two views can be theoretically linked

by associating the onset of decreased performance with the
filtering out of cues that are crucial to task performance.
Given that complex tasks often require attention to a wider
range of cues; and, given that the range of attention is
reduced as arousal increases, it follows that cues relevant to
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the execution of complex tasks are likely to be outside of the
reduced range of attention associated with increased arousal.
The

relationship

between

the

Yerkes-Dodson

law

and

the

Easterbrook hypothesis is depicted graphically in Figure 1.
The top graph in Figure 1 depicts both of the major tenets of
the Yerkes-Dodson law.

The inverted-U shape of each of the

curves demonstrates that performance of a given task is
optimized at some intermediate level of arousal.

The relative

position of the two inverted-U shaped curves demonstrates that
the level of arousal necessary to achieve optimum performance
on a complex task is less than that required for optimum
performance on a simpler task.

The bottom graph depicts the

Easterbrook hypothesis by showing that as arousal increases
the number of cues attended to decreases.
of arousal,

Under high levels

relatively few cues may be considered.

The

integration of the two graphs demonstrates that the number of
cues to be considered in order to achieve optimum performance
of a complex task is higher than the number required for
optimum performance of a simpler task.

If the level of

arousal experienced by an individual is higher than that which
is optimal for the performance of the assigned task, it would
be reasonable to expect this individual to attend to a smaller
number of cues than would be optimal, perhaps resulting in a
lower than optimal level of performance.
Kahneman

[1973,

p.

38]

summarizes

the

research

investigating the Easterbrook hypothesis as follows:
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This research demonstrates that high arousal causes
attention to be concentrated on the dominant aspects of
the situation at the expense of other aspects.
As
Easterbrook noted, such a change of allocation policy
will disrupt any performance in which attention must be
deployed over a wide range of cues.
Auditing tasks do, indeed, require attention to be deployed
over a wide range of cues in many situations.

In fact, the

"ability to see the 'big picture' in addition to the details
of a particular task," and the "ability to analyze information
and facts and understand relationships between facts" were
rated as two of the most important factors for success as an
auditor [Eldridge, 1992, see Appendix A]. These are precisely
the types of skills that the Easterbrook hypothesis predicts
will be impaired under conditions of arousal.

Given that time

pressure, a potentially arousing agent, is salient in the
auditing environment, the Easterbrook hypothesis predicts that
performance on tasks judged to be crucial for success as an
auditor will sometimes be impaired.
The behavioral law is closely related to the Easterbrook
hypothesis.

It states that increased arousal increases the

probability of the occurrence of the most dominant response
[Hull, 1943]. The Easterbrook hypothesis provides a plausible
explanation for the behavioral law; because the range of cues
utilized is reduced under stress, the dominant response has a
higher probability of occurrence.
The preceding discussion established the prediction that
a reduction in the range of cues attended to will occur under
arousal with an increased probability that the dominant cue
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Performance
Yerkes-Dodson Law

Arousal
Number of cues
attended to
Easterbrook
Hypothesis
**

Arousal
S =

Performancecurve for a simple task

C =

Performancecurve for a complex task

* =

Number of cues required for the
performance of a simple task

optimum

level of

** = Number of cues required for the
performance of a complex task

optimum

level of

Figure 1
Graphical Relationship between the Yerkes-Dodson Law
and the Easterbrook Hypothesis
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will capture attention. The focus now becomes the explanation
of

why

such

explaining

effects

why

such

should be
effects

noted.

are

In

likely

to

addition
occur,

to
the

literature will be called upon to outline the properties of
the cues that are likely to be dominant.

From this analysis,

it should be possible to predict which types of cues auditors
will attend to under varying conditions of time pressure.
Explanations of the Responses to Stress
Several speculative models of information processing have
attempted to provide insight as to why responses to arousal
noted by Easterbrook and Hull are likely to occur. Martindale
[1981]

proposed a hierarchical feature model based on the

frameworks developed by Sokolov [1960] and Walley and Weiden
[1973, 1974].

Hierarchical feature models are models with

multiple levels of cognitive processing units that possess
properties of upward excitation and lateral inhibition.7 As
they are general models of the determinants of cognitive
activity under a variety of conditions, they presumably can
provide insight into the determinants of auditors' responses
to stress.
Martindale's [1981] model conceptualizes primary memory
(or consciousness) as the set of currently activated cognitive
units and attention as a subset of these units (usually a

7 In order to present a more parsimonious account of
processing activity, discussion of the levels of processing
units will not be undertaken.
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subset of one) that is most strongly activated.8 Activation
of cognitive units nay result from arousal potential of the
stimuli present in the task with which the individual is
involved or the environment in which it takes place.
arousing

stimulus

is

perceived,

activation

When an

is

spread

throughout the system to all of the cognitive units. Because
of the property of lateral inhibition and the way that this
increased

activation

cognitive

units,

is

those

theorized
cognitive

to

interact with

units

that

were

the
more

activated than the others prior to the perception of the
arousing agent will receive most of the additional activation
introduced to the

system and become even more

activated following the response.

strongly

Martindale [1981, p. 251]

restates the Easterbrook hypothesis and the behavioral law in
terms of the hierarchical feature model as follows:
Increasing arousal increases the activation of the
dominant or strongest unit relative to the activation of
other units. ... [T]he most activated unit is the one that
captures attention.
Because attention was defined to be the subset of cognitive
units most activated at a given point in time and cognitive
units may be analogous to cues, increasing arousal increases
the probability that the dominant cue will be attended.

In

tasks where improved performance depends on both reducing the
number of cues attended to and processing a few key cues more
8 The term activation is used here to be consistent with
Martindale's [1981] model.
The term excitation, as it has
been used in other models, is virtually synonymous with
activation in this context.
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efficiently, increased arousal may be beneficial.

In tasks

where improved performance depends on attending to a wider
range

of

cues

and

integrating

them

into

an

overall

conceptualization of the task, increased arousal may hinder
performance.
The

hierarchical

feature model

described

above may

provide theoretical support for the Easterbrook hypothesis and
the behavioral law.

Several studies of attention provide

empirical support to augment the theoretical support.

The

performance decrements associated with increased arousal are
often most pronounced and visible in situations where two
tasks are being performed at the same time.

For this reason,

a dual-task paradigm has typically been employed to study the
effects of arousal on attention.
The dual-task methodology for addressing the issue of cue
utilization typically involves concurrent performance of what
are labelled "primary" and "subsidiary" tasks.

Broadbent

[1971] and Kahneman [1973] theorized that individuals do not
utilize all of their attentional capacity in most routine
tasks.

When arousal is increased for subjects performing

dual-tasks, they may respond by diverting excess attentional
resources to the primary task.

These resources might be

diverted

activities

subsidiary

from

non-task

task.9

In

related

designing

the

or

tasks

from
such

the
that

9 In situations where the primary task requires all
attentional resources prior to the introduction of arousal,
the diversion of resources may come from the primary task
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performance on the task is indicative of attention10, insight
is gained into the claim made by the Easterbrook hypothesis
that the range
conditions.

of attention will narrow under arousing

Several types of results, discussed below, could

be supportive of the Easterbrook hypothesis in this paradigm.
When arousal is introduced and individuals can allocate
attentional resources previously used for non-task related
activities to the "primary" task, performance on the primary
task may increase with no significant effect being observed on
the subsidiary task [Davies and Jones, 1975; Dornbush, 1965;
Hockey, 1970a; Hockey, 1970c].
be

conclusively

attentional

linked to the Easterbrook hypothesis

narrowing,

explanation.

Although these results cannot

it

does

provide

a

of

plausible

The results might indicate that the two tasks

initially required fewer attentional resources than were
available,

resulting

in

resources

activities not related to either task.

being

expended

upon

The increased arousal

may have caused attentional resources to be diverted from the
non-task related activities to activities associated with the
primary task.

This diversion in resources would cause an

itself. These types of tasks could be studied outside of the
dual-task paradigm because the effects on any subsidiary tasks
should be negligible (due to the possibility that very few
resources would have been allocated to the subsidiary task in
the initial condition).
10 Attention has also been referred to as effort or
concentration. The link between the construct of attention
and performance has been made in Kahneman [1973] and Eysenck
[1982].
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increased level of performance on the main task without
affecting performance on the subsidiary task.

It is from this

response that the upward-sloping portion of the inverted-U
shaped curve linking arousal and performance may be observed.
When increased arousal causes attentional resources to be
diverted from the subsidiary task rather than non-task related
activities, performance on this task can be expected to fall.
The performance decrement on the subsidiary task under arousal
appears to be indicative of attentional narrowing.

When

performance on the primary task increases in conjunction with
such an effect,

a reallocation of attention is suggested

[Eysenck, 1982].

Results supportive of this effect [Kausler,

Tr app, and Brewer, 1959; Bahrick, 1954; Bahrick, Fitts, and
Rankin, 1952; Rubin, Shantz, and Smock, 1962; Hockey, 1970b;
Hockey and Hamilton,

1970] would most likely,

again,

be

associated with the upward-sloping portion of the YerkesDodson curve.11

11 Although, only a small increase in performance of the
primary task coupled with a large decrement on the subsidiary
task would probably indicate that performance is on the
downward-sloping portion of the curve. The actual location on
the performance curve depends on the trade-off between
performance on the subsidiary and primary tasks.
If the
subsidiary task is very incidental to overall performance,
even large performance decrements would have relatively little
impact on overall performance.
If the subsidiary task is
important, however,
it would impact performance more
adversely.
It is not the purpose of this dissertation to
examine the nature of this trade-off for tasks outside of the
particular audit task which will be detailed in a subsequent
section.
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When a decrease in performance on a subsidiary task is
accompanied by unchanged performance on a primary task, it is
clear that the overall performance level would decline.

This

result would be indicative of a level of arousal that induces
the

type

of

performance

decrements

associated with

downward sloping portion of the Yerkes-Dodson curve.

the
Many

studies provide results supportive of this effect [Bacon,
1974; Kohn, 1954; McNamara and Fisch, 1964; Tecce and Tarnell,
1965; Thornton and Powell, 1974; Wachtel, 1968; Miller and
Dost, 1964; Silverman and Blitz, 1956; Weltman and Egstrom,
1966; Weltman, Smith, and Egstrom, 1971; Johnson and Thomson,
1962; Wolk and DuCette, 1974; Bell, 1978; Boggs and Simon,
1968; Cohen and Lezak, 1977; Davies and Jones, 1975; Finkelman
and Glass, 1970; O'Malley and Poplawsky, 1971],
provide

strong

hypothesis.

evidence

supportive

of

the

These results
Easterbrook

They indicate that, under arousal, attention may

become more focused on the cues most relevant to the primary
task at the expense of attention given to cues associated with
the secondary task.
Studies examining the level of time pressure present in
the auditing environment appear to indicate that the problem
facing the auditor is one where tasks are left incomplete in
response to arousing conditions, implying that the last group
of studies referenced above, where performance on neither task
increases, would have the most relevance for this study.

None

of the studies of the auditing environment have examined which
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type of tasks are likely to be affected most adversely.

The

dual-task paradigm used to study attention could lend insight
into this issue in the context of auditing.
Selection of the Dominant Cue
In addition to predicting that there will be a reduction
in the range of cue utilization under stress and explaining
why this reduction is expected to occur, the literature also
provides the basis to predict which types of cues will draw
attention.

The likelihood that a given stimulus will attract

an individual's attention is related to the extent that the
stimulus possesses arousal potential.

Berlyne [1971] and

Martindale [1981] discuss the links between attention and
sources and levels of arousal potential.
The relationship between arousal potential and attention
is hypothetically expected to take the form of an inverted-U.
Attention will be drawn toward stimuli as arousal potential
increases

until

it

reaches

the

point

where

attention will initiate an aversive response.

increasing

Berlyne [1971]

theorizes that a pleasure system is activated by stimuli
possessing a low level of arousal potential.

As the arousal

potential increases, the pleasure system will become more
activated and will be more likely to draw attention to the
stimulus.

Berlyne contends that a displeasure (or aversion]

system becomes activated when a stimulus possesses higher
levels of arousal potential thus causing attention to be
averted from the stimulus.

This effect is important because
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it introduces the concept of the level of attention paid to a
stimulus, a concept related to that of levels of processing
proposed by Craik and Lockhart [1972].

The level at which a

stimulus is attended to may be analogous to the level at which
the stimulus

is processed.

Within Craik and Lockhart's

theory, deeper processing involves a greater understanding or
interpretation of a stimulus.

So, while attention will be

drawn to many stimuli, the level of attention given to them
may or may not allow the processing of meaning.

The effect of

the reduction of the range of attention in response to arousal
described by Easterbrook may be more accurately described in
some cases as a reduction of the range of cues processed
deeply.

This phenomenon is analogous to the finding of

increased attentional lability under arousal documented by
Eysenck [1982].

The level of attention and depth at which

cues are processed depends upon the properties of the arousal
potential associated with a given stimulus.
Arousal potential can result from three properties of
stimuli— psychophysical,

ecological,

and

collative.

Psychophysical properties can be described as the physical
intensity of the stimulus (e.g. loudness, brightness, etc.).
Ecological properties can be characterized as signal value,
meaning, or significance.
surprise,

ambiguity,

and

Novelty, complexity, incongruity,
conflict

are

all

examples

collative properties of stimuli.
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of

The

arousal

properties

of

processing.

a

potential
stimulus

resulting

permits

the

from

ecological

deepest

level

of

Psychophysical and collative properties may draw

attention to a given stimulus, but if the meaning of the
stimulus is not apparent,
surface level.

it will only be processed at a

The cues can only be understood when the

ecological properties of the stimulus are attended to and
processed.

Within the dual-task paradigm in a situation where

the primary and subsidiary tasks require a relatively deep
level of processing, attending to the collative properties of
a stimulus may not be sufficient to obtain an understanding of
the cues.

The meaning (or ecological properties)

of the

relationship possessing these collative properties may need to
be explored.

When the stimulus possessing these collative

properties is associated with the subsidiary task and the
amount of attention required to derive the meaning behind the
relationship would detract from performance of the primary
task, it may be that the arousal associated with the prospect
of pursuing the relationship would reach the point where
attention would be withdrawn from the stimulus.

Recalling

that stress increases the level of arousal present in the
system

and

that

this

arousal

exaggerates

any

of

the

differences in arousal potential of stimuli that might occur
in non-stressful situations, it would follow that the effects
described

above

would

be

more

salient

under

stressful

conditions.
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Berlyne

[1963,

1971]

explains

such a phenomenon by

asserting that the optimal level of arousal potential is not
a maximal or a minimal level.
too high,

When the level of arousal is

discomfort in the form of stress,

affective state, results.

a negative

Individuals will attempt to alter

their stimulus field so as to remove themselves from negative
affective states to a state where an optimal level of arousal
potential is experienced [Fiske and Maddi, 1961; Hunt, 1963;
Berlyne, 1960, 1963].

Pieters and Van Raaij [1988, p. 128]

explain how individuals achieve such a state: "A decrease of
arousal potential is reached by 'solving' the inconsistencies
in the present

stimulus

field or by attending to

less

stimuli."
Pieters and Van Raaij's statement emphasizes the two ways
in which the narrowing of attention under stress may occur.
It may be the result of the tendency for increased activation
associated with stress to exacerbate any differences between
the arousal potential of cues. This tendency would cause cues
whose arousal potential may have been sufficient to draw
attention prior to arousal to remain unattended to in the
stressful environment.

In this case arousal would appear to

activate a sort of pre-attention filtering mechanism.
other hand,

On the

it may be the result of the negative affect

associated with continued attention to (and processing of)
cues that do not contribute directly to performance of the
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primary task.

In a sense, what is described is a sort of

attentional copin? mechanism.
These comments indicate a tendency toward a strategy of
simplification under conditions of arousal.

Such a strategy

would seem to conflict with the requirements of professional
auditing standards.
The Dual-Task Paradigm in the Auditing Environment
McDaniel's [1990] study provided significant insight into
the effects of time pressure in the auditing environment.
McDaniel focused on the extent to which performance of a
single task was affected by time pressure.12
presented

above

indicate

that

the

earliest

The models
and

most

significant effects of time pressure may not be detected with
an analysis that examines performance on only one task.

They

indicate that these effects are likely to have a significant
impact on a subsidiary task when two tasks are being performed
concurrently.
The question then arises as to whether or not auditors
are faced with situations where they are required to perform
two tasks concurrently.

As discussed in the introduction, it

seems quite clear that auditors do, indeed, perform concurrent
12 This discussion is not meant to detract from the
significance of McDaniel's study in any way.
In fact,
McDaniel's study provides the important foundation upon which
this study attempts to build through incorporation of an
altered version of the test instrument, operationalizing the
construct of time pressure in the same way, and measuring
audit
output performance
similarly.
Despite
these
similarities, this study cannot and does not attempt to
replicate McDaniel's results.
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tasks.

It is also evident that the same audit procedures

serve multiple purposes with respect to auditor judgment and
decision.

The authoritative standard regarding errors and

irregularities cited in the introduction makes that point
explicitly.

The following excerpt from the professional

standard that gives guidance on the auditor's responsibility
to detect possible violations of the going concern assumption
substantiates that claim:
It is not necessary to design audit procedures solely to
identify conditions and events that, when considered in
aggregate, indicate that there could be substantial doubt
about the entity's ability to continue as a going concern
for a reasonable period of time. The results of auditing
procedures designed and performed to achieve other audit
objectives should be sufficient for that purpose. [AICPA
1992, AU 341.05]
The following assertions, then, can be drawn from the
relevant

accounting

and

psychology

literature:

(1)

time

pressure is a salient feature of the auditing environment; (2)
increased arousal, which may be induced by time pressure, can
cause attention to become more focused on primary-task-related
cues at the expense
and,

(3)

of attention given to secondary cues;

the auditing context

is a dual cognitive task

environment in which the complex task of attending to red
flags may be considered secondary to other tasks.

The

research hypothesis that in the auditing environment time
pressure may cause auditors' attention to become focused on
cues related to test of details tasks at the expense of
attention to red flags emerges from these assertions.
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Intuitive support for this research hypothesis may be
derived from the recommendations of the National Commission on
Fraudulent

Financial

Reporting,

the

so-called

Treadway

Commission. The Treadway Commission made several observations
and recommendations to independent public accountants. Among
them

was

assignment

the
of

following

observation

responsibility

for

with
the

regard

to

consequences

the
of

fraudulent reporting:
In many cases, although indications of possible
improprieties, or "red flags," existed, independent
public accountants failed to recognize or pursue them
with skepticism.
The SEC believed that, if the
independent public accountants had investigated these red
flags, the fraudulent activity would have had a greater
likelihood of being uncovered. [National Commission on
Fraudulent Financial Reporting, 1987, p.25]
In

assessing

why

such

oversights

were

so

common,

the

commission went on to note the following situation:
Intense competition among accounting firms contributes to
significant pressure on audit fees,
cften with
corresponding pressure to reduce staff, time budgets, and
partner involvement in audit engagements. Such pressures
may not be conducive to the thorough investigation of red
flags indicating the potential for fraudulent financial
reporting or to the thorough exercise of professional
judgment and skepticism.
[National Commission on
Fraudulent Financial Reporting, 1987, p. 56]
As a result, they went on to make the recommendation that,
"Public accounting firms should recognize and control the
organizational

and

individual

reduce audit quality."
Financial Reporting,

pressures

that potentially

[National Commission on Fraudulent

1987, p. 56]

Clearly,

the research

hypothesis stated above is consistent with the findings and
recommendations of the Treadway Commission.
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In the current Congressional session,
Wyden

has

proposed House

Resolution

Representative

574,

Financial Fraud Detection and Disclosure Act.

the

so-called

Although the

bill basically reaffirms the responsibilities for financial
fraud

detection

standards,

this

and

reporting

action

serves

communicated
as

an

in

auditing

indication

of

the

government's increased interest in the way in which auditors
address the issue of financial fraud and red flag detection.
The

proposed

study

may

serve

to

clarify

the

factors

influencing auditors' ability to attend to red flags.
These events, observations, and recommendations add to
the compelling reasons for undertaking this study.

They

indicate that the significant pressures placed upon auditors
may cause them to subordinate red flag detection, a task not
directly associated with specific audit procedures, to tasks
for which the time budget holds them directly accountable,
such as substantive tests of details of balances.

As such,

these tasks would be considered primary tasks in the dual-task
paradigm while red flag detection would be considered a
subsidiary task.

Support for this conceptualization of the

auditing environment may be found in recent statements made by
the Public Oversight Board of the SEC Practice Section, AICPA
[1993]:
Before the turn of the century both auditors and the
users of audited financial information regarded the
detection of fraud as one of the primary purposes of an
audit. For many reasons the profession has moved from an
acceptance of that purpose to the view that its role in
detecting fraud is secondary to the other purposes of
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audits. In contrast, the public has continued to regard
fraud detection as an important goal of the audit
process— and now attaches even greater importance to that
goal [Public Oversight Board of the SEC Practice Section,
AICPA, 1993, p. 42].
The time budget is a very tangible means of assessing
performance.

As such, the ability to meet the time budget is

a criterion for evaluation on most audits.

Feedback on this

aspect of the auditor's performance is timely and clear.
Measures of an auditor's attitude of professional skepticism
and attention to complex issues is far less tangible.

Should

an audit fail to reveal an irregularity that was present at
the time of the audit, it may not be detected promptly, if at
all.

Feedback on this matter is not as timely.

Because

auditors are immediately accountable for performing audit
procedures within the guidelines of the time budget and less
immediately accountable for their attention to broader issues,
they may have a tendency to treat procedures as the primary
task and other issues as subsidiary tasks.
Figure 2 graphically depicts the relationship between the
Easterbrook hypothesis and the Yerkes-Dodson Law within the
auditing context.

The task of executing auditing tests of

details while being attentive to red flags is a relatively
complex task.

The task of merely executing auditing tests of

details without being attentive to red flags is a relatively
simple task.

When time budgets are

set restrictively,

auditors may experience increased levels of arousal.

Indeed,

the perception that the time allotted may be insufficient to
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Performance
Yerkes-Dodson Law

Arousal
Number of cues
attended to
Easterbrook
Hypothesis

Arousal
S =

Performance curve for executing the tests of details task

C =

Performance curve for the dual-tasks of concurrently
attending to red flags and executing tests of details

* =

Number of cues required for the optimum
performance of the tests of details task

level

of

** = Number of cues required for the optimum
performance of the concurrent attention task

level

of

Figure 2
Graphical Relationship between the Yerkes-Dodson Law and
the Easterbrook Hypothesis in the Auditing Context
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complete the procedures as assigned may induce more arousal.
At this heightened

level of arousal,

auditors may

find

themselves unable to attend to the full range of cues required
to concurrently execute the tests of details and attend to red
flags.
S inn -m ary

This section has examined the literature and the theory
relating to the effects of increasing levels of time pressure
on the performance of audit procedures that require attention
to red flags while executing tests of details.

The following

sections describe the design and results of an experiment in
which time pressure was manipulated at levels that placed
auditors beyond the peak of the inverted-U shaped curve
relating arousal and performance.

This experiment tests the

prediction that increases in time pressure would have a more
detrimental effect on the task of red flag detection than they
would on the primary task of executing substantive tests.
Such an effect could be attributed to the reduction of the
range

of

attention

under

arousal

as

predicted

by

Easterbrook hypothesis.
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CHAPTER 3
METHODS OF INQUIRY
Research Approach
The

previous

sections

outlined

the

problem

to

be

addressed in this dissertation, the reasons why such a problem
should be addressed, and the results that would be expected to
be obtained from such an investigation.

This section will

outline the method to be used to analyze the problem in
accordance with the specifications of the previous sections.
Included will be a discussion of why a controlled experiment
was considered more appropriate for addressing this problem
than the more common survey or field study approaches.
McDaniel [1988] documents the shortcomings of surveys and
field studies in an analysis of the effects of time pressure
on audit performance.

The primary weakness of the survey

method in this type of analysis is that there may not be a
direct link between actual allocation of attentional resources
and self-reported behaviors.

The reallocation of attention

under time pressure may be a passive and automatic process, or
it may be an active coping response [Eysenck,

1982].

In

either case, it is unlikely that self-reports would capture
the narrowing of the range of attention under time pressure.
If this reallocation of attention were passive, it is not
likely that it would be reported by survey respondents simply
because it would be unknown to them.

When it is an active

coping response, respondents may not be aware of its effects
44
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on performance.

Presumably, if subjects were aware that their

responses to time pressure were having the types of effects on
audit quality that were detailed in the Treadway Commission's
report they would not engage in them.
limitations,

As a result of these

the survey approach is not likely to be an

effective means of capturing the effects of time pressure on
attention and performance.
A field study approach may also be inappropriate because
it would be difficult to draw conclusions about the range of
cues to which auditors attend without direct output measures
of audit performance.

Output measures of audit performance

are not available on most audits as it is only in cases where
audits

are

investigated

that

any

indication

of

audit

ineffectiveness may be detected [AICPA, 1978; McDaniel, 1988].
That

is,

an

auditor's

failure

to

identify

a

financial

statement error may be realized only in instances where events
subsequent to the conclusion of the audit lead to such actions
as litigation alleging auditor negligence or peer review of
audit procedures.

In these instances it would be impossible

to manipulate and difficult to measure the construct of time
pressure.

So,

although the

field study approach might

maximize mundane realism or ecological validity, it would be
impractical to gather enough data to conduct a meaningful
analysis of the theoretical predictions discussed.
The preceding discussion indicates that an experimental
approach may be most appropriate.

The strength of the
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experimental method is the level of internal validity that can
be achieved with proper design.

Because it is the presence of

the psychological effect of a reduction in the range of
attention under time pressure that is of interest, care must
be exercised to ensure that the independent variable is being
manipulated appropriately and that there are reliable measures
of the variables of interest.
Subjects
Sixty-three auditors representing the offices of several
different

accounting

firms

in

participated in the experiment.

two

different

cities

The size of the offices

represented ranged from large Big Six offices to smaller
offices of regional accounting firms that provide audit
services.

While conducting an experiment on such a diverse

group presents certain threats to the internal validity of the
experiment, the generalizability of the results to the entire
population of auditors may be enhanced.

The results most

likely are not as sensitive to one particular firm's practices
and training with respect to red flag detection.

The threats

to internal validity are related to the possibility that the
experiment
locations.

was

administered

several

times

at

different

These threats were minimized through random

assignment of participants to the time pressure treatment
groups.
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Experimental Task
The primary concern in designing an experimental task to
achieve a high level of internal validity is that the subj ects
attend to independent variables.

In this dissertation, such

an effect would be achieved in large part if the subjects were
to experience greater levels of time pressure as the time
allotted to complete the task decreases, thus indicating that
the

construct

of

time

pressure

was

being

manipulated

effectively.
Consideration

of

internal

validity

issues

did

not

completely dominate the process of experimental task design.
Because this study explicitly examines the context in which
auditing occurs, particular attention was given to the mundane
realism of the experimental task.

As such, the experimental

task was similar to those performed under time pressure by
practitioners.

Such an experimental task was developed by

discussing audit procedures with practitioners, matching the
task to the appropriate experience level of the subjects, and
manipulating time pressure at levels normally experienced by
practicing auditors.
McDaniel [1988, 1990] developed and employed such a task
in

an

experimental

analysis

efficiency and effectiveness.

of

time

pressure

on

audit

In order to achieve a high

level of task realism, attention was given to the design
considerations noted above. The key to the appropriateness of
the

task,

however,

was

its

valid

manipulation

of
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pressure. The data obtained from McDaniel's post-experimental
questionnaire

indicated

that

the

subjects

did,

indeed,

experience greater levels of time pressure as the amount of
time allotted for the completion of the task decreased.
With some alteration of the data and instructions, the
main features of McDaniel's task were used to address the
research questions raised in the previous sections of this
proposal.

Because McDaniel's instrument was designed in

accordance with the specifications outlined earlier, has been
tested, and has been subjected to the scrutiny of peers, its
use has most likely provided a more powerful analysis than the
use of a completely original task would.

McDaniel's study

measured the effect of time pressure on the performance of a
single task, however.

In order to create a relevant second

task and to make the auditors aware of their responsibilities
for executing both tasks, McDaniel's experimental instrument
was altered.

Consistent with McDaniel's approach to task

design and influenced by conversations with McDaniel, the
alterations were incorporated based upon discussions with
practitioners and the results of an extensive pretesting
process.
An extensive pretesting process was undertaken in order
to adapt McDaniel's instrument for the purposes of studying
auditors' attention to red flags in a dual-task environment.
An incremental approach to revisions was taken to avoid making
unnecessary departures from McDaniel's task.

As a result the
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instrument was pretested by auditors seven different times and
twice

by

graduate

students

before

appropriate for the research task.

it

was

considered

The pretesting process is

described in Appendix B.
McDaniel's task was a test of details of inventory for a
medium-sized manufacturing client. The participating auditors
were given background information on the client and instructed
to gather evidence to test the valuation and completeness
assertions for finished goods inventory and inventory reserve.
The tests to be performed were outlined in a partial year-end
audit program.13 The data upon which these audit procedures
were executed consisted of inventory and inventory reserve
record prices and amounts for 25 products sold to each of the
60 customers of a hypothetical audit client.

The audit

program detailed the sample size and the source of the data
for each of the four tests of details.
instructed

to

indicate

whether

each

The auditors were
item

selected

for

investigation from the client's records was correctly reported
in the records or reported erroneously based on criteria that
were provided in the background materials.

McDaniel chose

this type of task because it is representative of what is
typically

performed

under

time

pressure

and

because

13
McDaniel examined the individual and interactive
effects of both time pressure and audit program structure on
effectiveness and efficiency. This study examines the effects
of time pressure using only the structured portion of
McDaniel's task.
As such, the task instructions would not
need to be so general as to communicate objectives to auditors
in both the structured and unstructured conditions.
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performance could be objectively measured.

It is also well

suited for this dissertation in that it involves the audit of
inventory— the

audit

area

most

fraudulent financial reporting,
survey

of

auditors

who

often

associated

with

as indicated by a recent

have

encountered

material

irregularities in audits [Loebbecke, Eining, and Willingham,
1989].
In administering the experiment, McDaniel imposed four
different levels of time pressure on different groups of
auditors.

The measurements made by McDaniel were of the

number of items examined for each of the tests and the
accuracy with which they were examined.

These measurements

provided information on the efficiency and effectiveness of
processing

that

were

validated

by

the

review

process.

McDaniel's task thus provides an important mechanism for
establishing an output measure of performance on a validated
audit test of details type of task.
As discussed in other sections of this dissertation,
auditors are required to execute such tests of details as
those prescribed in McDaniel's experimental task while being
attentive to red flags.

McDaniel's task did not address the

dual nature of the auditor's role.

The auditors executing

McDaniel's single audit task were not required to perform any
significant interpretation of the data processed.
The

following three types

of changes were made to

McDaniel's instrument in order to adapt it to a dual-task
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structure:

l) changes that made it clear to the participants

that they were responsible for being attentive to red flags in
addition to executing detailed audit tests; 2) changes that
indicate that red flags may be present; and, 3) changes that
increased

auditors' understanding

of

the

mechanics

implications of client policies and procedures.

and

A sample of

the proposed experimental materials reflecting the results of
all of the changes to McDaniel's test instrument is presented
in Appendix C.

The following discussion explains each of the

three types of changes that were made.
Auditors1 Responsibilities
Just as with McDaniel's task, the experiment involved the
execution

of

tests

of

details

of

inventory

records

in

accordance with instructions outlined in an audit program to
achieve the audit objectives of evaluating completeness and
valuation assertions.

Unlike McDaniel's task, however, the

participants were instructed that they were to be attentive to
any indicators of possible irregularities present in the data
and follow up on them just as they would in an actual audit
situation.

Statements emphasizing this point were disclosed

in the task instructions, the statement of audit objectives,
the audit program instructions, and the audit program.

Some

of these statements emphasized that attention to unusual items
and

possible

objectives.

irregularities

is necessary

to

meet

audit

Others emphasized that this attentiveness needs

to take place during the execution of all audit procedures.
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A third subset of these statements emphasized the importance
of following up on unusual items noted and documenting them.
Several practicing accountants at various levels of experience
reviewed the wording of these statements and did not consider
them to be inconsistent with audit responsibilities as they
are communicated in practice.14
Seeding Red Flags
In addition to the changes made to emphasize that the
participating auditors are responsible for executing a dual
role in this task just as they are in an actual audit
situation, changes needed to be made to the task materials in
order to seed red flags.

These changes can be classified

either 1) as statements indicating that the context in which
the client is operating provides the incentive and opportunity
for irregularities to occur or 2) as changes made to inventory
and reserve data that, especially when analyzed in conjunction
with the contextual factors present, indicate that there is a
strong possibility that irregularities exist.

The following

discussion describes these contextual and data changes.
Contextual Chances
The contextual changes to McDaniel's task were made to
increase the level of professional skepticism with which the

14 These practicing auditors were not assessing whether
or not the extent to which the task materials communicated the
auditor's responsibility to detect irregularities was
consistent with audit practice. The focus was on whether or
not the terminology and wording and meaning was inconsistent
with practice.
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auditors were to conduct the audit program tests.

Because

McDaniel studied a test of details type of task in which the
auditors knew that they were not responsible for providing any
significant

interpretation

of

the

results

of

the

audit

procedures applied, the main emphasis was on explaining the
limited objectives to be achieved.

In the revised task,

however, the auditors were informed of the broader objectives
of detecting, following up upon, and documenting any unusual
circumstances noted with regard to the client.
induce

the

auditors

to

adopt

an

attitude

In order to
of

increased

professional skepticism that would facilitate the attainment
of these broader objectives, the contextual environment needed
to communicate that such an attitude would be appropriate.
Loebbecke,

Eining,

and Willingham

[1989]

and SAS No.

53

[AICPA, 1988] detail several conditions and motivating factors
that

increase the

likelihood of material

irregularities.

Several of these factors were incorporated in a reasonable
scenario for the client described in the task materials.

They

were communicated to the auditors through an excerpt from the
audit

planning

memo

regarding

the

client's

operating

environment.
Included in this excerpt were two types of statements.
One type was designed to direct attention to the cues present
in the data suggesting that the client may be engaged in
irregularities.

Examples of this type of statement include

those that refer to and explain the implications of a lower
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aggregate

inventory turnover ratio.

The other type of

statement was designed to indicate that the conditions (or
opportunities)

and

necessary

irregularities

for

motivating

factors
to

(or

surface

incentives)

are

present.

Statements indicating increased risk, increased competition,
difficulty in retaining customers,

a slowing-down of the

movement of inventory, the presence of a financial statement
based incentive plan, and the centralization of authority
(communicated in the auditor's notes on the client's policy
for valuing the reserve) should serve to increase the level of
professional skepticism displayed by the auditors.

All of

these factors are consistent with the type of potential
irregularities that were seeded in the task data,

to be

discussed next.
Task Data Changes
McDaniel's task data was altered in two significant ways
to be appropriate for the study of the effects of time
pressure on auditors' attention to red flags.
distribution of the client's

First, the

customer sizes was changed

somewhat. McDaniel's task involved customers of approximately
equal sizes.

This distribution was achieved by randomly

selecting an integer between one and 1,000 for each average
monthly usage value for each of the 25 products sold to each
customer.

The number of units on hand was generated by

multiplying the average monthly use by a random number between
zero and three (for items that were randomly selected to be
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overstocked, average monthly use was multiplied by a number
between three and six).

In the revised task, the customer

sizes were altered to be more consistent with distributions
that auditors may encounter in actual audit situations [as
discussed in the Audit Sampling Guide, AICPA, 1992, AAG-SAM
4.16].

The task contains five very large customers,

moderately large customers, and 35 small customers.

20
The

reason for making this change is not just to add realism to
the task, as a lack of realism did not appear to be a problem
with McDaniel's task.

Rather, the change in distribution was

made to make the indicators irregularities seeded within the
data more salient.
The potential irregularities follow from the consistent
omission of overstocked items from the Reserve for Slow-Moving
and Obsolete Inventory record for two very large customers.
These are the only apparent material irregularities in the
data.

All of the other misstatements are more indicative of

errors (i.e., they are mostly transposition errors and appear
to be random in either direction).
errors

will

be

seeded

in

All of these types of

accordance

with

the

expected

population error rates (based on previous audit experience
with the client) reported in the task materials.

Although the

seeding rate of omissions from the reserve record is different
from that reported in the materials and by McDaniel, the
policy for valuing the Reserve for Slow-Moving and Overstocked
Inventory is the same.

This policy explains that the client
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being audited must record an entry for each item whose units
on

hand

exceeds

three

times

the

average monthly

usage

(quantities that are both reported in the finished goods
record).

The amount of this entry is given by the excess

units (i.e. the number of items in excess of three months
usage) taken at the item's current unit cost.

The total in

the Reserve for Slow-Moving and Obsolete Inventory Record is
subtracted from the total in the Finished Goods Inventory
Record to arrive at a final inventory valuation.
The average customer (excluding the two customers with
consistent omissions) has around four out of 25 products whose
quantity on hand exceeds three times the average monthly
usage.

Across all of these customers, all but three percent

of these items are properly reported on the reserve record.
For the two very large customers with consistent omissions
from the reserve record (hereafter referred to as the "red
flag" customers), the quantity on hand exceeds three times the
average monthly usage for all of the 25 products.
customers have an average number of items
reported on the reserve record, however.
policy,

These two

(around four)

Given the client's

these reserve item omissions have the effect of

overstating inventory and net income.

The number and pattern

of

the

these

omissions,

coupled

information discussed earlier,

with

other

contextual

indicate that there is an

increased likelihood that the client is perhaps seeking to
cover-up the loss of two very large customers.
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The systematic nature of the omissions, coupled with the
fact that a normal number of products are listed in the
reserve for these two "red flag" customers, decreases the
likelihood

that

oversight.

the

omissions

are

due

to

unintentional

Given the information in the task materials

regarding the policy for valuing the reserve (e.g., that the
policy is well established in the industry and that deviations
from the policy would impair the comparability of the client’s
financial statements with those of its peers), it is unlikely
that any intentional omission of items would be justifiable.
Even if the auditor did believe that they could be justified,
the matter would warrant documentation as an additional item
for supervisory attention.

Auditing standards in two major

areas provide support for the contention that, even though the
implications of such a situation are not completely clear, the
situation should be attended to and documented by auditors.
The following discussion outlines the authoritative guidance
on this matter.
The

first

source

of

guidance

pertains

consideration of errors and irregularities.

to

the

The systematic

nature of underreporting of excess inventory build-up of all
products sold to a few, key customers could be indicative of
either a management misinterpretation of the Inventory Reserve
policy, or an attempt to conceal the loss of key customers.
The former situation would constitute an error, the latter an
irregularity.

The data presented in the instrument would not
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be sufficient to draw a clear conclusion as to whether the
misstatement is intentional or not.

As such, it would be

inappropriate to dismiss the situation without appropriately
documenting it for further review.15 Auditing standards are
quite clear in asserting the importance of fully investigating
causes and effects of misstatements such as those proposed to
be seeded in the data:
The auditor should evaluate the significance of
differences between the accounting records and the
underlying facts and circumstances detected by the
application of auditing procedures. The auditor should
consider both the quantitative and qualitative aspects of
these matters and whether they are indicative of an error
or irregularity. Often a particular matter considered in
isolation cannot be identified as an error or
irregularity; nevertheless, this evaluation is important.
Because irregularities are intentional, they have
implications beyond their direct monetary effect and the
auditor needs to consider the implications for other
aspects of the audit. [AICPA, 1992, AU 316.22]
The

second

source

of

guidance

pertains

to

the

consideration of the entity's ability to continue as a going
concern.

Although the source of the misstatements of the

inventory reserve listing will be unknown to the participants
in the study, one conclusion that cannot be ruled out is that
the misstatements are an attempt to conceal the loss of key
customers.

Because the loss of a key customer is a situation

that— especially when combined with other negative conditions
and events— may signal the need to consider the entity's

15 The auditors will be expected to document any errors
that are noted.
As a result, failure to document any
situation which appears unusual could be considered to be
representative of audit ineffectiveness.
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ability to continue as a going concern

[AICPA,

1992, AU

341.06], the situation should be noted and considered for
further investigation.

The participants in the proposed

experiment will be executing their procedures without any
information on other audit areas. While they will not be able
to consider the interactive effects of conditions and events
noted in other portions of the audit, they will be encouraged
to

report

any

conditions

noted

in

this

area

so

such

considerations could be made.
These two areas of authoritative guidance indicate that
misstatements of the type seeded in the experimental data
should be documented if the subjects devote enough attention
to

them to understand their

implications.

Because the

instructions clearly state that any unusual items should be
documented in the space provided, the documentation provided
by the auditors should serve as a measure of the attention
given to these cues.
items

and

document

ineffectiveness.

Neglecting to devote attention to these
them

would

be

indicative

of

audit

The presence and extent of documentation of

these misstatements would then constitute output measures of
performance that would be indicative of the extent to which
attention

is

paid

to

subsidiary

task-related

stimuli.

McDaniel's audit effectiveness score applied to the results of
the tests of details should measure the attention devoted to
the primary task. These measures of performance and attention
will be discussed in greater detail in a subsequent section.
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Client Policy and Procedure Clarification
Because of the broader audit objectives facing the
participants in this study as opposed to McDaniel's study,
changes that promoted a greater understanding of the mechanics
and implications of the client's policies and procedures were
necessary.

The broader audit objectives were put in place to

encourage auditors to give more attention to unusual items and
relationships.

The process of pretesting the test instrument

revealed that auditors were attending to and investigating
unusual relationships, but that some of the items that the
auditors

were

investigating

were

unrelated

to

the

irregularities seeded in the data. Often these investigations
were based on suppositions made about information that was
confusing to the auditors.

Clarifying information was added

to the materials to keep subsequent auditors from pursuing
these "dead end" or misleading investigations.

Specific

examples of these changes are detailed in the discussion
below.
First, the number of items for which there were zero
units reported in the Finished Goods Inventory Record when in
fact there were units on hand caused several pretest auditors
to make fruitless investigations.
little basis in reality.

This type of error has

It was appropriate in McDaniel's

task because the auditors were not required to understand the
implications of the errors that were encountered.
proposed task,

however,

In the

the auditors were attempting to
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explain those
existed.

items for which no reasonable explanation

For this reason, the seeding rate for these items

was reduced from 8% to 1%, also resulting in a reduction in
the number of items required to be sampled in the inventory
test count (from 60 to 25 per Audit Sampling Guide, AICPA,
1992, AAG-SAM APP A]).

Because this reduced the amount of

audit procedures required to be executed, the amount of time
allotted

for

the

completion

of

the

task

was

adjusted

accordingly.16
Also misleading to the auditors was the client's policy
for valuing the Inventory Reserve
McDaniel's task).

(as it was titled in

Because several auditors did not realize

that a failure to disclose an item on this reserve record
resulted in an overstatement of inventory and net income, the
name

of

the

record was

changed

and a section

"Auditor's Notes on Client Policy" was added.
record was

changed to the

"Reserve

for

entitled

The name of the
Slow-Moving and

Obsolete Inventory" to more accurately reflect the nature of
the items to be included.

A sample journal entry that clearly

16 This adjustment was made by dividing the number of
processing items eliminated with this adjustment (35) by the
average number of items processed per minute (2.75) for the
subjects in McDaniel's study [1988, p. 58]. The result (12.7
minutes) represented an estimate of the amount of time
eliminated from the task by reducing the required sample size
of the finished goods omission step.
The additional time
required for increased responsibilities and the time required
to induce a lower level of time pressure were also factored
into the decision on the total time allotment. These factors
were estimated to require approximately the same amount of
time as was eliminated by reducing the sample size.
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showed how the omission of items from the record would affect
assets and net income was also given.

Because several pretest

auditors believed that excessive omissions from this record
may be indicative of an inappropriate policy rather than a
reporting problem, a statement was added that established the
policy as an accepted industry standard.

These changes made

the implications of omissions from the reserve record less
ambiguous.
have

Auditors who attended to this information should

realized

departure

that

such

from generally

omissions
accepted

are

indicative

of

a

accounting principles.

Appendix D summarizes the differences between McDaniel's test
instrument and the test instrument used for this study.
Design
Having outlined the experimental task proposed to analyze
the effects of time pressure on attentional processes of
auditors, the remainder of this section will detail the design
considerations.

Key topics in this section include the

manipulation of the independent variable and the measurement
of the dependent variables.

Some of the content of the post-

experimental questionnaire will also be discussed in this
section.
As detailed in the previous sections, the literature on
the effects of arousal predicts a narrowing of the range of
attention under time pressure.

Under conditions of time

pressure, attention should become more focused on the data
associated with the primary task of execution of the detailed
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tests outlined in the audit program.

This focusing is likely

to come at the expense of the type of attention that permits
the processing of meaning associated with data related to the
subsidiary task of reviewing listings for quantities and
amounts that appear unusual.

Because individuals under time

pressure are less likely to devote attention to the data at a
level that

facilitates the processing of the ecological

properties (or meaning) of the stimulus, it is predicted that
they will be less likely to detect and document the excess
inventory build-up and Inventory Reserve omissions.

Further,

because of the findings of studies investigating the effects
of arousal on dual-task performance, it is predicted that the
decline in the performance of this subsidiary task will
precede the decline in performance of the test of details.
Independent Variable
Time pressure, the independent variable manipulated in
this experiment, was operationalized by restricting the time
allowed for completion of the task.

This method is consistent

with the approaches of McDaniel and Waggoner and Cashell
[1991].

The

levels

of

time

pressure

imposed

on

the

participants included positions on either side of the apex of
the inverted-U shaped curve relating stress and performance.
By allowing the participants in the four treatment groups 75,
65, 55, and 45 minutes to complete the experimental task, the
desired range was likely to be achieved.

These times are

based upon both the results of McDaniel's experiment involving
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a very similar task given to 22 pilot study participants and
90 practitioners and extensive pretesting
task.

of the proposed

McDaniel's experimental groups were allotted 75, 65,

55, and 45 minutes to complete the task.

In the lowest time

pressure group ( 75 minutes) in McDaniel's task, participants
used,

on average,

86

percent of the timeallotted for the

task.

In the 65, 55, and 45 minute time budget conditions,

the respective averages of time used were 94, 96, and 99
percent of the allotted time.

McDaniel's task required

auditors to execute the detailed tests on more sample items
than is the case in this task.

As a result, imposing the same

time constraints should have resulted in slightly less time
pressure being experienced.
The reason that lower time pressure conditions were
included is that performance of the subsidiary task (red flag
detection)

is

predicted by

psychology

literature

to

be

affected by increased arousal prior to the performance of the
primary task (the tests of details).

McDaniel, in order to

examine the effects of time pressure on only the test of
details performance, imposed time pressure at a level where
test of details performance was impaired.17 Because the focus
of this study was on the tasks that are hypothesized to be
affected before the primary task of executing audit tests of
details, time pressure was imposed at lower levels than in
17
McDaniel also examined the effect of another
independent variable, audit program structure, and the two
variables' interactive effect on test of details performance.
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McDaniel's study.

This study analyzes whether or not the task

of red flag detection is affected at time pressure levels
where performance of the test of details task is not affected.
The measurements used to conduct such an analysis are detailed
below.
Dependent Variables
Test of Details Performance
The measurement of effectiveness and efficiency of the
test of details task performance, or primary task performance,
is consistent with the model presented by McDaniel [1988,
1990] as described below.

Audit effectiveness (denoted Y,) is

measured as the sum of the four individual audit effectiveness
scores (Yu) relating to each of the audit program steps, and
is calculated as follows:
Yi =

(Si=M(YH)), where

= ([(i^ - eiJ/nJ x 100) x to/iO ,
where
nj = the number of items examined in procedure i, i = 1
- 4,
e} = the

number

rejections

of

auditor

or

incorrect

applying procedure

errors

i to

(i.e.,

incorrect

acceptances)

made

each

nj items

of

the

in

selected,
ni*=

the sample size necessary to achieve the audit
objective for procedure i.
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As indicated above, the effectiveness score for each
procedure is based upon 1) the number of items examined in the
execution of the given audit program step, 2) the number of
errors made in performing the audit program step, and 3) the
sample size required by the audit program step.
factors

are

measurements

documentation of activity.

obtained

from

The first two
participant

The third factor, the sample size

required by the audit program step, is the number required to
achieve the audit objective of obtaining 90 percent confidence
that the true error rate for each error type does not exceed
the tolerable error rate of 15 percent.

Consistent with

McDaniel's task, the sample size is that required to achieve
the stated objective using a single stage fixed sampling plan
[AICPA, 1983, p. 107].

Contrary to McDaniel's measurement,

the participants will not be able to increase their audit
effectiveness

scores

for

this

test

of

details

task

by

examining more items than are required by the audit program.
This condition ensures that the maximum score that could be
achieved for each of the procedures requiring sampling is 100.
This score would be attained if participants correctly process
at least as many items as are required by each audit program
step.

The maximum score, then, is 400 (resulting from scores

of 100 on each of the four procedures to be scored in this
manner).
The overall audit effectiveness score is a product of
components that McDaniel labels (1) nonsampling processing
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accuracy

([(r^ - e;)/nj

x 100)

and

(2) achieved sampling

adequacy (n^n/) . The accuracy component may be of particular
interest in identifying how well the procedures were performed
independently of whether or not the procedure was actually
completed.

This analysis may lend insight into whether any

performance decrements are a product of inadequate processing
or merely an inability to complete the assigned procedures.
Performance

decrements

associated with the

inability

to

complete the audit procedures are not as interesting to this
study except to the extent that the inability to complete the
procedures may have been caused by slower processing under
time pressure.18
Red Flag Detection Performance
Subsidiary task performance is related to the auditors'
ability to detect and analyze the red flags present in the
task.

Recall that it was asserted that there are two ways in

which the narrowing of attention under stress may manifest
itself with respect to subsidiary task performance (discussed
in section II.3.).

It may be simply that fewer cues are

attended to under time pressure, or it may be that fewer cues
will be attended to at a level that permits the processing of
their ecological properties.

Several different methods of

18 As detailed in the analysis, there were performance
decrements associated with an inability to complete assigned
audit procedures.
Further analysis revealed that auditors
under pressure did not appear to execute procedures more
slowly.
This finding lends importance to the accuracy
component as a measure of test of details task performance.
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eliciting auditor responses have been incorporated into the
task to measure the extent to which each of these effects
occurs.

The remainder of this chapter details these methods

and the results obtained.
As discussed in the previous chapter, the red flags in
this task are grounded in the incentives and opportunities
described in the contextual environment as well as the data
for the two "red flag" customers with unreported overstocks of
inventory.

While it is important for the auditor to recognize

the incentives and opportunities in order to operate with an
increased level of professional skepticism and to generate
hypotheses about the nature of any irregularities that are
detected, the main measure of performance of the subsidiary
task

is the extent to which the auditor recognizes the

irregularities present in the data.

As such, measurement of

the extent to which auditors in each time pressure group
attend to the data for the two "red flag" customers is central
to the analysis of subsidiary task performance.
Measurement data was gathered from two main sources— the
additional documentation and written comments provided by the
auditors

and

the

assessments

made

on

a

questionnaire

administered at several intervals during the experiment. Both
of these measurement sources will be outlined below.
First,

the additional documentation provided by the

auditors was analyzed and classified according to the extent
to which the subjects noted the discrepancies in the records
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for the two "red flag" customers.

Each set of experimental

materials was reviewed for indications that the auditor
attended to the situation involving the two customers.

Three

different classifications that examine progressively deeper
levels of processing were made.
The first such classification was designed to be the most
sensitive to any indication that the auditor attended to any
aspect of the situation involving the misstated customers.
Each

set

of

materials

was

thoroughly

reviewed

for

any

indication that the auditor noted that one (or both) of these
customers was (were) different in any way from the others.
The emphasis was on detecting any relevant marks made outside
of the normal documentation of the detailed tests
circling

of

the

inventory

turnover

(e.g.,

ratio— which

exceptionally low— or the units on hand total— which
exceptionally

high

for

the

affected

customers,

is
is

extra

calculations not associated with the tests of details for
these customers,

any notation of the need to investigate

anything with regard to these customers). For the purposes of
this measurement, any set of materials with any such relevant
notations was classified as "detected.N

Any set without such

notations was classified as "not detected."
The

second classification was designed to capture a

slightly deeper level of processing of the cues indicating the
presence

of

irregularities.

For an

item to have been

classified as "detected" with this measurement, there had to
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have been some indication that the auditor realized that
several items relative to one of the two "red rlag" customers
were

left off the Reserve

for

Slow-Moving

and Obsolete

Inventory record and/or proposed an adjustment to correct the
misstatement.

Auditor documentation in this case needs to be

more complete than it would with the first classification
(e.g., several "X"s— indicating an error— in the "Reserve Item
Omission"

column

of

the

task

materials,

preliminary

calculations of the understatement of the reserve, or a note
that an adjustment to the reserve would have to be made).
The final classification was made based on indications
that the auditor considered some of management's incentives
and opportunities to provide materially misleading financial
statements.

The analysis for this classification considered

whether or not the auditor attempted to generate hypotheses as
to how or why the misstatement was made and to what extent the
financial statements are misstated (e.g., recognition of the
incentives related to financial statement based compensation
plans,

increased competition, decreased profitability, the

possible loss of major customers that could lead to going
concern problems, the recognition of opportunities related to
corporate diversity and divisional autonomy, top management
involvement

in

routine

inventory

obsolescence

entries,

inappropriate audit procedures that failed to audit average
monthly usage figures for the fourth quarter when conditions
had changed).

Again, if any of these considerations were
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incorporated

into

a

given

classified as "detected."

auditor's

analysis,

it

was

Those who do not progress to this

level of understanding of the situation were classified as
"not detected."
The second major type of measurement data comes from
several, identical questionnaires that were administered at
the 15 minute mark of the experiment and at ten minute
intervals

thereafter.

A

presented in Appendix E.

copy

of this questionnaire

is

These questionnaires asked auditors

to assess the likelihood of material misstatement arising from
each of the four types of errors seeded in the data and to
assess the likelihood that material irregularities and/or
financial fraud are present.

This measurement was designed to

provide information about the level of understanding obtained
by the auditors as well.

Those who did not indicate that

there is a relatively high likelihood of misstatement due to
omission of items from the reserve probably did not attend to
the cues present in the data.
is

a relatively high

Those who indicated that there

likelihood of misstatement due to

omission of items from the reserve but did not assess a high
likelihood of irregularities or financial fraud probably did
detect the omission of items from the reserve but did not
assimilate the other red flags into the analysis.

Those who

assessed a relatively high likelihood to all three situations
have probably attended to the indicators at a level that
yields an understanding of their implications.
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The reason that the questionnaires were given at the 15,
25, 35, 45, 55, 65, and 75 minute marks is that it enabled
analysis of all of the different time pressure groups at the
same point in time as well as at the end of the allotted time.
While

the

frequent

administration

of

the

questionnaires

allowed for measurements to be taken during the task, they may
have

increased

environment.
to

give

the

artificiality

of

the

experimental

In addition, they may have induced the auditors

greater

attention

to

indicators

irregularities and financial fraud.

of

potential

These threats to the

validity of the experiment may have been reduced since the
questionnaires were given with the same frequency to each of
the treatment groups.
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CHAPTER 4

DATA ANALYSIS, DISCUSSION, AND SUMMARY
Data Analysis
Administration of the Experiment
The experiment was administered at five locations in
November and December, 1993.

Although the time between the

separate

the

administrations

of

experiment provided

the

opportunity for history effects19 to threaten the internal
validity of the experiment [Cook and Campbell, 1979], measures
were

taken to minimize

realized.

any

such

effects

that might

One of these measures was the way in which the

experimental materials were ordered and distributed.
were

four

be

different

time

pressure

conditions

different versions of the experimental materials.

and

There
four

The fourth

version of the 65 minute time pressure condition was selected
at random as the first set of materials to be distributed.
The remainder of the experimental packets were systematically
ordered thereafter with the fourth version of the 75 minute
condition next, the fourth version of the 45 minute condition
after that, and the fourth version of the 55 minute condition
after that.

The third version of the 65 minute condition was

next and the others followed the same order.
then distributed,

The packets were

in this order, to the auditors as they

arrived at the site, thus ensuring that virtually the same
19 History effects may occur when an observed effect may
be attributable to events which occur in the time period
between tests.
73

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

74

number of

subjects would be

assigned to

condition at each administration site.

each treatment

By distributing the

packets equally across treatment conditions, the firm effect
and the history effect on results should have been minimized.
At each location, upon arrival the auditors were given an
envelope containing experimental materials and were directed
to take a seat in one of four areas of the room depending on
the treatment condition assigned.20 They were instructed to
keep the envelope closed until they were given instructions to
begin working.
task

After they were seated, they were given the

instructions.

verbatim.

These

instructions

were

read

aloud

Afterward, they were shown the timer that they

should use to document the time taken on the task and were
informed that an audit program in the experimental materials
would indicate the total time allotted for the task.

They

were told that the materials differed among auditors and that
they should be concerned only with the progress of their own
work.

Finally, they were instructed that they would be asked

to complete a questionnaire every ten minutes and that time
had been allotted in the audit program to respond fully to it.
Following these instructions, they were told to open their
packets and begin working on the assigned task.

The final

20 Although tighter control could have been exercised by
segregating the treatment groups into two or four rooms, the
one-room method did not appear to affect the results
significantly. Interviews with participants indicated that
they were generally unaware of the different completion times
and were unaffected by the activities of other participants.
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questionnaire given to each auditor in each participant group
contained

instructions

to

stop

working,

materials, and to place them in the envelope.
a post-experimental questionnaire and were

assemble

the

They were given
instructed to

complete it without referring to the experimental materials.
Of the 63 subjects,
satisfactorily.

all but one completed the task

The one subject's materials were invalidated

when he reopened his experimental materials and began marking
on them after reading some of the questions on the postexperimental questionnaire.
Of the 62 remaining subjects, nine had less than one year
of experience and three had over six years of experience.
Because the task in the experimental materials was designed
for individuals at the one year experience level or higher
[McDaniel, 1990], and because the auditors were instructed to
execute their assigned responsibilities as they would in a
normal audit situation, individuals with less than one year of
experience were excluded from the analysis.

The auditors with

over six years of experience were also excluded from the
analysis based on the fact that at this level they have
reduced responsibility for executing tests of details as
designed in the experimental task.

As a result, the final

sample sizes were 14, 15, 11, and 10 for the 45, 55, 65, and
75 minute conditions, respectively. Interestingly, the random
assignment of experimental materials produced a situation
where all nine of the individuals with less than one year of
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experience and all three of those with greater than six years
of

experience

conditions.

were

assigned

to

the

65

and

75

minute

Subsequent analyses exclude these subjects.

Although the analysis to be reported in the following sections
uses the reduced sample— that which excludes the nine auditors
with less than one year of experience and the three auditors
with

more

than

six years

of

experience— each

of

these

statistical tests was conducted on the full sample as well.
In no case did the results of these tests produce a conclusion
different

from

that

obtained

using

(assuming an alpha level of .05).

the

reduced

sample

Table 1 presents the

demographic data for the total sample and the sample upon
which the analysis was conducted.
differences

between

treatment

There were no significant
groups

on

any

of

these

demographic items.
Manipulation Checks
In order to assess the successful manipulation of the
construct

of

time

pressure,

manipulation

checks

of

the

independent variable were included in the post-experimental
questionnaire.

Consistent with McDaniel, the participants

were asked "How much time pressure did you actually feel
during the inventory exercise?" and "On average, how much time
pressure do you feel in your daily work?"
were

asked

to

respond

on

a

The participants

seven-point

scale

with

1

representing "very little time pressure" and 7 representing
"substantial time pressure."

The means of the responses to
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Table 1
Sample Demographics
All
subjects

Reduced
sample

"Detected"
*

62

50

6

Months of public
accounting experience

35.45

31.28

34.50

Age

26.86

26.62

25.33

Number of engagements
providing experience with
inventory testing

10.61

6.92

8.67

Number of subjects with
Master's degree

5

4

1

Number of subjects
previously involved in an
audit in which the client
had engaged in financial
fraud

3

1

0

Number of subjects
previously involved in an
audit in which the client
had a material
irregularity

13

11

1

Demographic item
Number of subjects

* "Detected" column contains information for those who
were classified as detected under the first measure of
subsidiary task performance because they documented
anything unusual about the two "red flag" customers.
the first question are expected to increase with increasing
levels of time pressure.

The means of the responses to the

second question should have been constant across all treatment
groups.
Based

on McDaniel's

findings,

it

is

expected

that

auditors generally will indicate that they experience more
time pressure on the job than they did during the experiment
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and that the difference should decrease as the time allotted
for completion of the task decreases.

To the extent that

auditors with more than one year of experience generally have
been exposed to similar time constraints in their daily work,
the measurement of the difference in reported levels of time
pressure may provide a better measurement than the direct
question on the amount of time pressure actually experienced.
Although
experienced

the mean
in

level

completing

the

of

time pressure

experiment

actually

increased,

as

expected, with decreases in the time allotted, the one-way
analysis of variance (ANOVA) indicated that the effect was not
statistically significant

(p ^

.37).

Additionally,

the

difference between the mean of the reported level of time
pressure experienced by those in the 45 minute group (4.21)
was not significantly different from that of the 75 minute
group (3.30) (t(df„2Z) =1.03, p £ .31).

Similar findings were

obtained using the measurement of the difference of time
pressure experienced during the experiment and in daily work.
The ANOVA

indicated that the manipulated

level

of

time

pressure did not produce a statistically significant effect in
the differences between experimental and daily work related
time pressure (p £ .20).
for

the

45 minute

The mean difference in time pressure

group

(-0.36)

was

not

significantly

different from that of the 75 minute group (-2.00) (t^.aj =
1.66, p < .11).

These results indicate that it would be

inappropriate to conclude that the independent variable of
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time pressure was appropriately manipulated between the four
groups.

As a result, an analysis was undertaken to determine

which groups experienced significantly different levels of
time pressure.
A post hoc analysis of the responses to the experienced
level of time pressure revealed that the greatest difference
was

found

conditions.

between

the

55-

and

65-minute

time

pressure

This result was consistent with pretest findings

indicating that the mechanical execution of the procedures
took about 45 minutes and the reading of the materials took
about ten minutes.

It was also consistent with the result

reported by McDaniel

[1988, p.58] that subjects averaged

between 2.6 and 2.9 items processed per minute.

Given that

auditors were asked to process 150 items in the dissertation
instrument,

the execution of the task should have taken

between 58 and 52 minutes.

Because of this apparent dichotomy

and the lack of significance of the results when analyzed
across four groups, an analysis of time pressure was repeated
on the data when the 45- and 55-minute conditions were
consolidated into one "highH time pressure condition, and the
65- and 75-minute groups were consolidated into one "low" time
pressure condition.
When the subjects are classified in this way, the mean
difference between the level of time pressure experienced
during the experiment and the time pressure experienced in
daily work for the high time pressure group

(-0.28) was
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significantly different than that of the low time pressure
group

(-1.80)

(t(dX=47) = 2.21, p £ 0.032).

As discussed

previously, the key to the design of an experiment is the
valid manipulation of the independent variable.

In this

experiment, the conclusion that the subjects experienced a
greater amount of time pressure as the time allotted was
decreased is valid only when the data are aggregated into two
groups and measured by the difference metric described above.
As a result,

all subsequent statistical analyses will be

conducted only on the aggregated data.

Consistent with

McDaniel's findings and my expectations, the mean reported
level of time pressure experienced in daily work for the high
time pressure group (4.58) was not significantly different
from that of the low time pressure group (5.00) (t(df=47) = 0.96, p < 0.341), suggesting a homogeneous sample.
Test of Details Performance
Having explained the manipulation of the independent
variable, the discussion now shifts to the results associated
with the dependent variables.

Test of details effectiveness,

or the output measure associated with what was theorized to be
the primary task, was a function of processing accuracy and
sampling adequacy.
details

While the overall measure of test of

effectiveness

for

the

high time

pressure

group

(354.85) was significantly lower than that of the low time
pressure group (380.57)

(t(if>s4#) = -2.20, p £ 0.033), it is

unclear as to whether the difference is a result of an actual
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decline

in the proficiency with which audit tests were

executed or rather a result of truncated procedures.

That is,

the test of details effectiveness measure may be over
sensitive

to

constraints.

the

truncation

of

procedures

due

to

time

It is possible that auditors under high time

pressure were executing procedures with equal speed and
accuracy but were simply cut short by the time constraint.

In

this case, despite the lower overall effectiveness score, it
may not be appropriate to conclude that they achieved a lower
level of performance on the test of details task.

The self-

reports of time taken to complete each of the audit steps
helps to illuminate this issue.
This issue arises because the self-reported average time
taken to complete the task for the low time pressure group was
over 58 minutes— well in excess of the time allotted for the
high time pressure group.

In addition, analysis of self-

reports, detailed in Table 2, indicated that 15 out of 29
subjects under high time pressure did not report a time for
the completion of all of the audit steps.

The corresponding

ratio in the low time pressure group was four out of 21.
Furthermore, an analysis of the self-reported time taken to
complete all but the last of the assigned procedures revealed
that the mean total time reported for the high time pressure
group (36.81 minutes) was significantly lower than the mean
for the low time pressure group (44.68) (t( d f = -3.60, p £
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0.002).21

These

results

indicate

that

the

lower

audit

effectiveness scores for the high time pressure group, while
most likely due to the inability of the auditors to complete
all of the assigned procedures, are not a result of slower
processing.

In fact, the self-reports indicated that those

under high time pressure executed the first three procedures
faster than those under low time pressure.22
Table 2
Analysis of Time Taken to Complete
Audit Program Steps
Treatment
group

Sample
size

Number
completing
all steps
(within 10
items)

Selfreported
time to
complete all
steps

Selfreported
time to
complete
all but
last step

45

14

6

44.2 (n=6)

33.6 (n=13)

55

15

8

51.1 (n=8)

40.0 (n=13)

65

11

8

55.1 (n=8)

43.0 (n=10)

75

10

9

61.6 (n=9)

46.6 (n=9)

Total/Avg

50

31

53.84 (n=31)

40.1 (n=45)

21 Because Levene's test for equality of variances was
significant (F = 4.25, p =< 0.045), the separate variance t
test is reported here.
The pooled variance t test was
virtually identical. Six auditors, three in each group, were
excluded from the analysis because they did not self-report
the time spent on all of the steps included in the analysis.
22 Because most of those who ran out of time failed to
complete the final assigned procedure, self reports were not
available over all four steps for all auditors.
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It appears then that significant difference

in the

overall audit effectiveness scores observed between groups may
not be the result of decreased efficiency in the execution of
the tests of details but rather the result of a truncation of
the

execution

constraint.

of

the

procedures

induced

by

the

time

The following analysis examines the processing

accuracy component of the effectiveness score to identify
whether the lower effectiveness scores are due to lower
accuracy or simply uncompleted procedures.
As the measure of audit effectiveness can be broken down
into an accuracy component and a sampling component, it may be
appropriate to consider the accuracy component as a measure of
the proficiency with which the actual audit test of details
task is executed.

Recall that the measure of accuracy is the

ratio of correctly processed items to total items processed
times 100 for each audit procedure.
400

is

again

the

maximum

score

As a result, a score of
that

may

be

attained.

Theoretically, this score could be attained by processing only
one item (correctly) for each of the four procedures for which
documentation was required.23

To ensure that the results

would not be biased by such an approach,

the data were

examined to determine if any subject appeared to be operating

23 A fifth audit program step, that of reviewing the
records for items, products, amounts, and customers that
appear unusual was also included on the audit program.
Because this step is primarily associated with what has been
theorized to be the subsidiary task, red flag detection, this
step is not referred to in this portion of the analysis.
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with such a strategy.

All subjects appeared to review the

materials and attempt to complete at least three of the test
of details procedures. Apparently nine subjects were unable
to fully complete one of the four procedures.

All of these

subjects apparently attempted to complete the other three
steps.

Three subjects were excluded from the analysis because

they did not provide any documentation for one of the audit
steps.24 The results of the pooled-variance t-test indicated
that there was no significant difference in the mean level of
accuracy between the high (397.11) and the low (398.47) time
pressure groups (t(df=4S) = -1.15, p < 0.257).

Because Levene's

test for equality of variances was marginally significant (F
= 3.336, p < 0.074) a separate-variance t-test was also run.
The results similarly indicated that there was no significant
difference between the two groups (t(df=4262) = 1.20, p < 0.235).
These results depart from McDaniel's finding that processing
accuracy

decreased

significantly

from

low

to

high

time

pressure among subjects who attempted to execute procedures in
accordance with an audit program.

Recall that this study

24 The measure of accuracy requires the division of the
number correctly processed by the total number processed for
each step. The accuracy score could not be computed for those
who did not process any items for one of the steps because it
would create a situation where the denominator was zero. The
analysis was also run by calculating an accuracy score where
the totals were aggregated, thus eliminating the division by
zero situation.
The results under this analysis were not
significantly different from the results reported in the text.
The former method was reported in the text to be consistent
with the measurements provided by McDaniel.
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intended to manipulate time pressure at a lower level than did
McDaniel's.

It is possible that time pressure was manipulated

at a level where accuracy was not affected as greatly.
A separate analysis of the overall test of details
effectiveness scores was run on only those individuals who
essentially completed all of the audit program steps upon
which the score was based.

This test redefines accuracy as

processing without error and processing the assigned number of
items.

That is, it considers both errors of commission and

errors of omission (e.g., a subject who processes 72 out of 75
assigned

items with one mistake

in processing would be

classified as having made four errors under this measurement
as

opposed

to

one

error

under

the

previously

reported

measurement). It removes from the analysis those who simply
did not get close— defined as within ten inventory count,
reserve,

or

pricing

items

of

completing one or more steps.25

the

number

assigned— to

The mean of the test of

details effectiveness scores for the high time pressure group
(393.80, n = 14) was not significantly different from the mean
of the test of details effectiveness scores for the low time

25 The cut-off point of ten items was selected because it
allows for auditor miscounts of the number of items selected.
For example, it is possible that the auditor would examine 73
items for a procedure in which 75 was the assigned number. In
this case, the explanation that the auditor simply miscounted
the number of items selected is more likely than the
explanation that the auditor failed to complete the procedure.
The analysis was performed using a cut-off point of five items
with very similar results.
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pressure group (395.21, n = 17) (t(df=29) — -0.55, p < 0.589).
As would be expected, this analysis excluded more individuals
from the high time pressure condition (15) than it did from
the low time pressure condition (4).
Table 3 summarizes the major hypotheses tested relative
to the test of details task, the a priori expectations, the
results obtained, and the overall level of significance of the
t-tests.

Taken as a whole, these results appear to indicate

that time pressure was

imposed at a level that did not

significantly affect the manner in which the test of details
were performed.

Time pressure, as it was operationalized in

this task, appeared to affect the extent to which auditors
completed the task but not the level of accuracy with which
items were processed.
Table 3
Hypotheses, Results, and Significance Levels
for Tests of Details Performance
Result

p-value

There will be no difference in the
test of details effectiveness
scores for the low and high time
pressure groups.

difference

p<0.024

There will be no difference in the
test of details accuracy scores
for the low and high time pressure
groups.

no
difference

p<0.235

Among those who essentially
completed all assigned audit
steps, there will be no difference
in test of details effectiveness
scores for the low and high time
pressure groups.

no
difference

p<0.589

Research hypothesis
H.,
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While these results may appear to conflict with the
results presented by McDaniel, the apparent inconsistency may
be resolved when one recognizes that this study did not
attempt to replicate McDaniel's results.

The dissertation

test instrument was based upon McDaniel's, but the changes
that were made to the instrument and the differing goals with
regard to the manipulation of the independent variable of time
pressure precluded the replication of results.

The changes

made to the test instrument were discussed in a previous
section.

The

differences

in

the

manipulation

of

the

independent variable are discussed below.
McDaniel examined the effects of time pressure on the
single cognitive task of executing tests of details.
study

examined

the

effects

of

time pressure

in

This

a dual

cognitive task environment in which the execution of auditing
tests of details was the primary task and the detection of red
flags was the subsidiary task.
time

pressure

increased,

The theory predicted that as

attentional

resources

would

be

diverted from the task of attending to red flags to the test
of details task.

Thus, the prediction was made that auditors

under high time pressure would suffer performance decrements,
relative to the low time pressure group, on the task of
attending to red flags but would not show a decline in
performance on the test of details task.

In order to observe

this effect, time pressure needed to be manipulated at levels
where performance decrements on the test of details task were
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not expected to occur.

McDaniel's intended manipulation of

time pressure was designed to include levels at which the test
of details task was affected, however.

Alternatively stated,

while McDaniel expected to find a decline in performance for
the high time pressure group, this study did not.26
results

presented

above

are

consistent

with

The
those

expectations.
While this explanation is intuitively appealing, it may
not fully explain the observed results.

The conclusion that

time pressure was manipulated at a lower level in this study,
thus not producing the negative effects on test of details
processing accuracy that were observed by McDaniel, does not
explain why a high number of individuals in the high time
pressure group failed to complete the task.

One possible

explanation is that the task materials used here contained
horizontal lines under each inventory item, thus making it
easier to follow the data for a particular item across the
page. McDaniel's result may have been more heavily influenced
by decreases in visual acuity associated with increased time
pressure.

Given the cosmetic changes in the materials, it is

possible that a higher level of pressure would have been
necessary in order to observe decreases in the proficiency

26 Recall that while the actual amounts of time allotted
for completion of the task was the same between studies, the
tasks were different.
McDaniel's study required the
examination of more items within the tests of details. As a
result the same time restriction was expected to create less
time pressure in this study.
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with which tests of details were executed.
explanation,

the

point

remains

that

Whatever the

McDaniel's

results

indicate that there is a level of time pressure at which the
proficiency of execution of audit tests of details will be
affected.

The results reported here indicate that this level

of time pressure was not reached in this experiment, thus
setting the stage for the analysis of whether the proposed
subsidiary task of attending to red flags was affected.
Red Flag Detection Performance
The analysis now focuses on what was theorized to be the
subsidiary task, that of attending to red flags.

The first

measurements to be considered are those associated with the
documentation provided by the auditors in the experimental
materials.

The first measurement purported to capture any

attention at all that may have been given to the two customers
for whom the inventory records were likely to be misstated.
Each of the experimental packets was evaluated as a whole and
classified as either "detected" or "not detected" based on
whether or not any notation was made that distinguished at
least one of these customers from the others.
As the data from this classification is clearly nominal,
a Chi-square test of independence may be appropriately applied
for analysis.

The assumption of normality that underlies the

Chi-square test is dependent on the expected frequencies in
each of the cells of the contingency table.

In order to allow

the discrete Chi-square test statistic to approximate the
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continuous Chi-square function, the expected frequency of each
cell needs to be quite large.

The generally accepted rule for

the application of the Chi-square test is that it should not
be employed when greater than 20% of the cells have expected
frequencies

of

less

than

five

[Siegel,

1956].

More

conservative guidelines indicate that an expected frequency of
five

is the minimum acceptable frequency

[Howell,

1982;

Conover, 1971].
Panel A

of

Table

4 presents

contingency table format.

the data

arranged

in

Because 50% of the cells had an

expected frequency of less than five, this statistic may not
be

appropriately applied.

As

a result,

Fisher's

exact

probability test was used to analyze whether the two groups
differ in the proportion with which they fall into the two
classifications.

The results of the Fisher's exact test (p <

0.040) indicated that the two groups differ with respect to
the probability that their members will be classified as
"detected."

The implication is that auditors under time

pressure may be less likely to report the cues signalling
possible misstatements.

This finding is consistent with the

hypothesized effect of time pressure and thus lends support to
the theory predicting that, under arousal, attention will
become more focused on primary-task-related activities at the
expense of subsidiary-task activities.

This result would

appear to confirm the Treadway Commission's point regarding
the pressures that may not be conducive to the recognition of
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indications

of

possible

improprieties.

Demographic

information for the auditors who were classified as "detected"
under this measurement is presented alongside the other
demographic information in Table 2.
This measurement of subsidiary task performance captured
a very low level of recognition.

That is, it measured whether

the auditor recognized that the referenced items appeared
unusual or different without taking into account whether or
not

the

auditor

understood

indications of impropriety.

that

they

were

preliminary

The measurement that takes into

account the auditor's recognition of the referenced items as
indicators of possible financial statement misstatements is
discussed below.
The second measurement of subsidiary task performance
required

some

understanding

of

the

financial

statement

implications in order to achieve a "detected" classification.
Panel B of Table 4 presents the data arranged in contingency
table format for this measurement.

Again, Fisher's exact

probability test was used to analyze differences between the
groups.

The results again indicated that the two groups are

significantly different with respect to the probability that
their members will be classified as "detected" (p £ 0.026).
Alternatively stated, auditors under high time pressure were
less likely to attend to and understand the implications of
red flags than those under low time pressure.

This finding is

also supportive of the research hypothesis.
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Table 4

Contingency Tables:

Panel A:

Red Flag Detection Performance

Measurement One— Documented Anything Unusual

Time Pressure Level
Performance

High

Low

Not Detected

28

16

44

Detected

1

5

6

29

21

50

"Detected” = Documented anything unusual about either
of the two "red flag” customers

Panel B:

Measurement Two— Understood Misstatement

Time Pressure Level
Performance

High

Low

Not Detected

29

17

46

Detected

0

4

4

29

21

50

"Detected" = Documentation indicated that there may be
a misstatement with regard to one or both
of the "red flag" customers

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

93

No statistical

analysis was conducted on the third

measurement of subsidiary task performance in the sequence
because none of the auditors provided sufficient documentation
to conclude that an understanding of the opportunities and
incentives was integrated with the cues in the data.

Reasons

why this result was observed are presented in the discussion
section.
relative

Table 5 summarizes the major hypotheses tested
to

the documentation provided

detection task,

on the

their a priori expectations,

red flag

the results

obtained, and the overall level of significance of Fisher's
Exact tests.

Taken as a whole, the results would tend to

indicate that subjects under time pressure were less likely to
provide documentation that either identified the "red flag"
customers as being unusual in any way or identified the "red
flag" customers as potentially misstated.

In short,

time pressure did appear to affect performance of the red flag
detection task.
In addition to the output measures associated with the
documentation provided

by

the

auditors

discussed

above,

questionnaires were issued during the experiment to elicit
assessments of the likelihood of misstatement due to each of
the error conditions in the data and the likelihood of fraud
and irregularities.

The following discussion details the

analysis of the data provided on the questionnaires.
In order to determine whether the level of time pressure
affected the detection of the consistent omissions from the
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Table 5
Hypotheses, Results, and Significance Levels
for Red Flag Detection Performance
Research hypothesis

Result

p-value

H„i

The high and low time pressure
groups will differ with respect to
the probability that their members
will be classified as having noted
anything unusual for the two "red
flag" customers.

difference

p<0.040

Hb2

The high and low time pressure
groups will differ with respect to
the probability that their members
will be classified as having
documented that there is a
potential misstatement with regard
to at least one of the "red flag"
customers.

difference

p=0.026

Hb3

The high and low time pressure
groups will differ with respect to
the probability that their members
will be classified as having
documented the incentives and
opportunities present for
committing irregularities.

no
difference

n/a

reserve record for the two "red flag” customers, the average
assessed likelihood of material misstatement due to omission
from the reserve was compared across groups.

Separate

analyses were conducted on the averages computed from the 45
minute

questionnaires

for

all

groups,

the

55

minute

questionnaires for the three groups who completed them,27 and
the

final

questionnaire

completed

by

each

group.

27
Because those in the 45 minute time restriction
condition were not asked to complete a 55 minute
questionnaire, this group was omitted from the analysis.
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Additionally, the average difference between the assessed
likelihood of material misstatement due to omission from the
reserve and the average assessed likelihood of the other three
sources of misstatements, were compared across groups. Again,
separate analyses were conducted on the averages computed from
the 45 minute questionnaires for all groups, the 55 minute
questionnaires for the three groups who filled them out, and
the final questionnaire filled out by each group.

This

analysis most directly parallels the second measurement based
on auditor documentation— that of the number of auditors who
noted that there may be a material misstatement relative to
the two customers with excess units on hand.
factors

can

affect

the

questionnaire

Because more

responses,

the

questionnaire is a less direct method of measuring attention
to the indicators of a misstatement.
were

to

be

attained,

however,

it

If significant results
would

reinforce

significant result obtained from the other metric.

any
The

following discussion details the analysis of the questionnaire
items designed to approximate the third measurement based on
auditor documentation— that of the number of auditors who
integrated

their

opportunities

to

understanding
commit

of

the

irregularities

incentives
into

and
their

documentation.
To determine whether time pressure affected the auditors'
ability to recognize the misstatements as intentional, the
average change in assessed likelihood of irregularities was
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compared across groups.

The average change in assessed

likelihood was calculated from the difference between the
assessed

likelihood

questionnaire
questionnaires.

of

and the

irregularities
assessed

on

likelihood

the
on

15
the

minute
later

Again, separate analyses were conducted on

the average changes computed from the difference between the
15 minute and 45 minute questionnaires for all groups, the 15
minute and 55 minute questionnaires for the three groups who
filled them out, and the 15 minute and final questionnaire
filled out by each group.

The same analysis was conducted on

the assessed likelihood of financial fraud.
None of the analyses related to the questionnaires issued
during the experiment as discussed above provided significant
results.

Generally the differences were very small and in

some cases in the opposite direction from what was expected.
This failure to reject may have been due to several factors.
One factor was that, according to the analysis of auditor
documentation, only four of the auditors (all in the low time
pressure condition)

detected and understood the apparent

financial statement implications of the items omitted from the
reserve.

In addition, several auditors who did not attend to

the potential irregularity achieved results of audit tests
indicating that the reserve was likely to be understated.

The

fact that auditors were instructed to select their own sample
items from each page may have created a situation where their
sample may have included several items that were improperly

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

97

omitted from the reserve.

In this situation, an assessment of

a high likelihood of misstatement due to omission from the
reserve would be appropriate.

Such an assessment may have

diluted any effect that the responses of those who attended to
the potential irregularity might have had.
those

who

did

attend

to

the

In addition, even

indicators

of

potential

irregularities appeared to be hesitant to label the situation
as an irregularity or especially a financial fraud.

This

finding will be discussed further in the following section.

Discussion of Results
Having presented the statistical analysis of the data,
the focus now shifts to a discussion of these results and some
of the procedures that were aimed at discovery rather than
traditional hypothesis testing.

A question could arise with

regard to whether the detection and/or

investigation of

unusual items relative to the two potentially improperly
reported customers was done concurrent with or subsequent to
the execution of audit procedures.

This consideration is

important because the theoretical development discussed the
effects

of

time

pressure

on

the

range

of

attention.

Specifically, it was asserted that auditors under low time
pressure were more likely to be attentive to a broad range of
cues while executing tests of details than were those under
high

time pressure.

The

significant results

that were

obtained would not be attributable to the effects of time
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pressure on attention, however, if the indicators of potential
fraud were attended to after completion of the test of details
tasks.

If, for example, an auditor in the low time pressure

group who was classified as wdetectedN first executed all of
the tests of details in 55 minutes and then went back and
found an unusual item while browsing through the materials for
the remaining 20 minutes,

this result would have little

bearing on the range of attention.

It would be inappropriate

to say that this auditor was more attentive to red flags while
executing tests of details.

It would simply mean that

auditors with excess time on their hands may be more likely to
uncover red flags.

In audit practice, however, it is very

rare that auditors will spend extra time on "completed"
procedures as there is always another set of procedures
waiting.

If, on the other hand, the auditors under low time

pressure were to provide documentation demonstrating that red
flags were attended to during the execution of tests of
details during the first 45 minutes, it would reinforce the
conclusions drawn from the significant statistical results
discussed earlier.
In

order

to

monitor when

the

documentation

of

the

potentially misstated customers occurred, the auditors were
instructed to use regular graphite pencils for the first 45
minutes and different colored pencils for each of the ten
minute intervals thereafter (the pencils were provided to
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them),n

The color of the documentation provided information

on whether those who were classified as "detected" in the
previously described process detected and investigated the
items during the normal execution of audit procedures or
whether they did so only after completing all audit steps.
Alternatively stated, this measurement technique was used to
assess whether the primary and subsidiary tasks were performed
concurrently or sequentially.
In each of the six cases where an unusual item was
identified, the auditor provided documentation indicating that
it was detected within the first 45 minutes.

This result may

indicate that the significant difference obtained for this
measurement was not simply due to the case where the auditors
under low time pressure had more time to go hunting for
problems at the end. Rather, it indicates that auditors under
less time pressure may be attentive to a broader spectrum of
cues that may be present in the data as they execute audit
procedures.

This

result

would

be

consistent

with

the

theoretical development that predicted a narrowing of the
range of attention under time pressure.
The analysis of the timing of documentation was also
conducted on those who demonstrated an understanding of the
red flags, that is, those who were classified as "detected"

28
All but two individuals complied with these
instructions.
Exit interviews and a review of their selfreported time provided information on when documentation was
made.
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under the second measurement.

In three of the four cases

where an understanding of the potential financial statement
misstatement was documented, the documentation was provided
within the first 45 minutes.
Insight into the issue of perceived deficiencies in the
area

of

attending

to red

flags may

also

be

gained

by

considering possible explanations for why none of the auditors
carried the investigation to the point where the incentives
and

opportunities

for

committing

irregularities

were

considered in the analysis of the potential misstatements.
This tendency to avoid such an analysis did not appear to be
due to time pressure, as three of the four auditors who were
classified

as

"detected"

under

the

second

measurement

indicated that the time pressure during the experiment was
quite low (all three responded that the time pressure was at
"2" on a seven-point Likert scale with "1" representing "very
little time pressure").

Furthermore, none of the four who

self-reported the time spent on each audit procedure indicated
that there was a shortage of time.

In fact, their self-

reports indicated that they finished three, six, eight, and 22
minutes before time was called.

The implication is that there

would have been plenty of time for these individuals to relate
the potential misstatement to the information in the task
materials that referred to opportunities and incentives to
commit irregularities.
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Possible explanations for their failure to take the
analysis to a higher level are that the auditors did not
consider such an effort to be within the scope of their
responsibilities in the artificial experimental context or
that

they were

simply

impervious to the

indications of

incentives and opportunities for irregularities and did not
understand the implications of the potential misstatement, or
a combination of both.

In order to analyze the possible

reasons why a deeper level of analysis was not conducted, the
documentation

relevant

to

the

potential

misstatement

is

reproduced in Appendix F for each auditor who was classified
as "detected" by either of the measurements.

Appendix G

provides an example of the type of analysis that integrates
the contextual information on incentives and opportunities for
irregularities into the documentation.

It is presented as the

"optimal" analysis in that it highlights the indicators of
potential irregularities identified in SAS 53 [AICPA, 1992]
that are present in the case and provides a recommended course
of action.
From the documentation displayed

in Appendix F,

it

appears that the auditors were either awaiting the opportunity
to discuss the matter with supervisors or the client or
deferring the matter until additional documents could be
examined.

Clearly there were not enough materials present in

the audit task
this

to make a final determination as to whether

hypothetical

client

was

indeed

involved
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irregularities.

It is possible that no such investigation was

undertaken because they did not feel accountable for doing so
in an artificial experimental context.29

It is concerning,

however, that a deeper level of analysis was not undertaken
given that (1) the task materials included several statements
emphasizing that they were to follow up on procedures and
document results just as they would in an actual audit
situation, (2) they were instructed that the only way in which
they

could

communicate

their

findings

was

through

the

documentation in the materials, and (3) all of the auditors
appeared to have additional time to investigate more deeply
any situation of concern to them.
There are two reasons why this result is of concern.
First,

without

a

deeper

investigation

and

richer

documentation, the situation may not be attended to by a
reviewer of the working papers, especially in cases where the
documentation also includes references to other, more trivial,
types of errors.

Because reviewers face pressures similar to

those executing detailed audit procedures, a given stimulus
(in this case documentation of the potential irregularity)
needs to possess relatively strong psychophysical, collative,
or ecological properties in order to draw attention.

Second,

when the auditor lacks an awareness of the incentives and
opportunities for irregularities present in the client's
29 Earlier discussion detailed how the task of potential
financial fraud detection may not be one for which auditors
feel accountable in actual audit practice.
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environment, the auditor is less likely to execute the followup procedures with an appropriate degree of skepticism.
To illustrate, the recommendation given in Appendix G
discusses the follow-up procedure of examining sales invoices
and other records of sales activity for the fourth quarter of
the fiscal year under audit and the subsequent first quarter.
This procedure was most likely analogous to the procedure used
at interim to audit average monthly usage figures over the
first three quarters.
most

likely

be

Given the situation, however, it would

inappropriate

to

conduct

the

follow-up

procedures with the same level of skepticism as the tests at
interim.

Whereas the invoices examined at interim could have

been scanned for the quantity, price and overall genuineness,
the invoices examined in the follow-up procedure should be
carefully scrutinized.
and quantities,

In addition to verifying the prices

the auditor should carefully analyze the

prenumbering sequence, to see if the invoices in question
could have been produced on the asserted date.

Signatures

should be scrutinized more closely, and the documents should
be checked for any indications of tampering.

The auditor who

is unaware that the likelihood of irregularities is relatively
high, given the incentives and opportunities present, is less
likely to exercise procedures with this appropriate level of
skepticism.
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Summa-ry

Evidence reported here suggests that tine pressure may
cause auditors' attention to become focused on cues related to
test of details tasks at the expense of attention to red
flags.

This conclusion is based upon evidence that the

proficiency with which auditors executed the test of details
task (as measured by processing accuracy) did not suffer under
time pressure but the proficiency with which they detected and
investigated the red flags did decline.

The fact that all of

those who detected these indicators did so within the first 45
minutes of the experimental task regardless of the time
constraints

that

they were

under

lends

support

to

the

contention that those under less time pressure attended to a
broader range of cues while executing the detailed tasks.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

CHAPTER 5

CONTRIBUTIONS, IMPLICATIONS, LIMITATIONS,
AND EXTENSIONS OF RESEARCH
Overview
This study was conducted to investigate the effects of
time pressure on auditors' attention to red flags in a dual
task environment.

It was predicted that under time pressure

attention would become more focused on the primary task,
(i.e., an auditing test of details type of task)

at the

expense of attention given to the subsidiary task (i.e., a
task of attending to red flags).

Several authoritative

sources were cited that supported this conceptualization of
primary and subsidiary tasks in the auditing environment.

The

theoretical development described the effects of time pressure
as consisting of an element that causes the attentional field
to be narrowed thus creating a situation where fewer cues are
noticed at all, and an element that causes individuals to
filter out stimuli that complicate the task at hand.

The

terms pre-attentive filtering mechanism and attentional coping
mechanism, respectively, were advanced to describe these two
effects.

The Treadway Commission [1987, p. 25] implicitly

referenced both of these effects when it indicated that
independent accountants did not detect or investigate with
skepticism items that may have indicated the presence of
material misstatements and advanced time budget pressure as
one possible cause of these behaviors.

105
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This research reported evidence consistent with the
theory that predicted a decrease in the performance of the
task of attending to red flags (secondary task) would occur
while the accuracy with which the test of details task
(primary task) would be performed would remain stable.

This

decrease in the performance of the red flag detection task was
observed at two levels— the level at which anything at all
unusual was attended to and documented and the level at which
the unusual customers were linked to a potential misstatement
of the financial statements.

The nature of the documentation

provided also permitted insight to be gained relative to the
manner in which potential misstatements may be handled in
audit situations.
Contributions
Several prominent researchers in the area of accounting
have called for research investigating the context in which
accounting takes place [Hogarth, 1991; Ashton et al., 1988;
Dopuch, 1992; Lord, 1992].

This research has attempted to be

responsive to this call by studying the contextual feature of
time pressure in auditing.

In addition to incorporating time

pressure, this research also considered the dual nature of the
auditor's role as a significant feature of the contextual
environment.

Support for the assertion that the task of

attending to red flags takes place in a dual-task or multipletask environment was provided by statements of the Public
Oversight Board of the SEC Practice Section of the AICPA,
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Treadway Commission, Auditing Standards Board, and surveys of
practicing accountants.

Drawing upon a well established line

of research incorporating the dual-task paradigm in studying
the effects of arousal on attention, this research attempted
to predict the effects of time pressure on auditor attention
to red flags in this experimental context.
Implications
It is not the purpose of this dissertation to reject the
idea that time pressure can be effectively imposed to promote
operational efficiency and effectiveness in the auditing
environment.

Clearly, a certain level of arousal is necessary

in all tasks to reach the optimum level of performance.

Time

pressure can be a very effective method of inducing such
arousal,

especially for tasks that do not

attention be given to the "big picture.”

require that

The Yerkes-Dodson

Law states that the optimum level of arousal for complex tasks
is lower than the optimum level of arousal for simple tasks.
Based on this concept, an attempt should be made to tailor the
level of arousal induced to the type of task being performed.
Accounting firms should be aware not only of the effects
of time pressure on their employees, but also on entire firms
as well.

The level of litigation and the government attention

being given to the profession may create a tendency to reduce
the range of cues to which firms attend as well.
become

more

concerned

with

"bottom

line”

They may
type

of

considerations than they would under less stressful conditions
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[Weick, 1983].

The time budget, which often represents the

billable hours for the firm, is one factor that contributes
heavily to the "bottom line."

Weick [1983, p. 359] indicates

that such a response is likely to occur:
As economic times get worse, there is a strong tendency
to tighten controls. Budgets are cut, people are fired,
products are dropped, amenities are canceled, and all of
this is accompanied by much closer scrutiny of all
operations that remain. This tightening of the control
system both intensifies the stress any remaining person
feels and also makes it harder to invent a response that
can reverse the process.
The implication of this study is that excessive emphasis on
the time budget and the production of documentation associated
with tests of details can cause auditors to lose sight of
overall audit quality.

Because of the relative infrequency of

red flags and the lack of a means of measuring attention to
them in a normal audit situation, there may be a tendency to
overemphasize the objective measurement provided by the time
budget in the performance of test of details types of tasks.
Such an emphasis can result in a subordination of the task of
giving attention to red flags to that of generating the
documentation required of audit tests of details.
Limitations
This research was concerned with the effect of time
pressure on auditors' ability to detect red flags.

This study

did not attempt to provide evidence that would permit a
general statement to be made on how well auditors execute this
task.

The only references made in regard to how well auditors

execute this responsibility were reiterations of the public
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statements and pronouncements made by such groups as the Board
of Directors of the AICPA, The Public Oversight Board, and the
Treadway Commission.

While care was taken to design the task

to be analogous to an actual audit situation, it would be
inappropriate to generalize the findings relative to this case
too greatly.
This study reported evidence supporting the existence of
a

pre-attentive

filtering

mechanism,

as

there

was

a

significant difference in the number of individuals indicating
that they noticed anything at all unusual about the inventory
records for the potentially misstated customers.
could

not

make

a

strong

case

attentional coping mechanism.

for the

The study

existence

of

an

This arises from the fact that

it could not be determined that time pressure plays a role in
preventing those who detect unusual items from investigating
them to the point where they can determine that there is a
potential misstatement.

The data provide little insight on

this matter because only one auditor under high time pressure
even detected anything unusual.

That is, because only one

auditor under time pressure noted any unusual items, it is
difficult to say whether or not time pressure would cause
auditors to forsake the deeper investigation of apparently
unusual items in favor of completing test of details types of
procedures. Although the theoretical development suggests the
existence of an attentional coping mechanism and the Treadway
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Commission implicitly referenced such an effect, the evidence
was insufficient to conclude that it exists.
These results do not imply that red flags will not be
detected in audits where time pressure is high.

This study

did not permit auditors to use the decision aids, or tools and
other procedures that might be highly effective.

It was not

possible to predict what type of mediating effect these tools
may

have.

Also,

this

study

did

not

incorporate

the

supervision and review dimensions of the auditing environment.
These are two procedures that are explicitly required by
Generally Accepted Auditing Standards to ensure an acceptable
level of audit quality.
auditors

indicated

The documentation provided by the

that

they

may

have

instructions from a more senior auditor.

been

awaiting

The implications of

this limitation were discussed fully in a previous section.
An additional limitation arises from the fact that audits are
normally

conducted

in

an

audit

team

situation.

This

experiment did not allow for any interaction between auditors
and thus its generalizability may be limited.
Despite efforts to preserve the ecological validity of
the task, it is possible that the auditors who participated in
the experiment did not view the task as realistic,

thus

limiting the conclusions that can be drawn from this research.
One way in which ecological validity may have been impaired is
through the frequent administration of the experimental
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questionnaires.

These may have been disruptive in that they

affected the continuity of work.
In addition to the concerns over the ecological validity
of the experiment, there were several threats to its internal
validity as well.

Particularly, having to administer the

experiment in several different settings introduced threats
that may not have been present in a more controlled setting.
Differences in the way in which the instructions were read,
the time of the day, the questions asked and peer attitudes
may have affected the results.

Having members of different

treatment groups in the same room may have confounded the
manipulation of the independent variable, as those under low
time pressure may have noted that others were completing the
task before them.
Extensions
Many of the limitations discussed above may actually be
an opportunity for extension of this study.

As such, this

study is seen as the first in a line of research that
investigates factors influencing auditors' ability to detect
red flags.

The materials may be able to be revised so that a

larger proportion of the auditors might detect something
unusual for the two questionable customers.

Such a result

would allow the attentional coping mechanism to be more fully
tested.

Future administrations of the experiment may allow

for the use of audit tools or collaboration in a group
environment.

Other opportunities for extension of this study
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arise from the nature of dual-task paradigm research into the
effects of arousal on attention.

Time pressure is just one of

several possible arousing agents that could be analyzed within
this paradigm.

Future extensions could incorporate others of

these individually and jointly with time pressure.

Also,

opportunities exist for refinement of the operationalization
of the construct of time pressure.

In keeping with past

research into time pressure, this study operationalized the
construct by restricting the allotted time.

There may be

other ways of inducing time pressure as well.
Conclusion
The Public Oversight Board, a group dedicated to the
preservation

of the quality and

integrity of

the audit

process, has identified the issue of red flag detection as a
major concern facing profession.

The following statement, in

the context of financial fraud, reflects the board's attitude
toward the issue:
The Board believes that, to a greater extent than it now
does, the profession must accept responsibility for the
detection on fraud by management. The profession cannot,
and it cannot be expected to, develop methods that will
assure that every fraud, no matter how cleverly
contrived, will be unearthed in the course of the audit,
but it must develop means of increasing significantly the
likelihood of detecting fraud [Public Oversight Board of
the SEC Practice Section, AICPA, 1993, p. 42].
By identifying one of the conditions that may be decreasing
the likelihood of attending to red flags and measuring
effect,

this

study

has

provided

the

profession

its
with

information that may assist in achieving the recommendations
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of the board.

In doing so, this dissertation is responsive to

each of the three goals of cognitive research in auditing
identified by Hogarth [1991]— 1) to advance understanding of
how auditors perform judgment and choice tasks; 2) to provide
some measurement of how well they perform these tasks; and, 3)
to suggest ways of improving performance.

By examining

performance on dual-tasks and explaining this behavior from a
cognitive

perspective,

each

of

these

objectives

may

advanced.
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APPENDIX A

TOP-RATED SENIOR SUCCESS FACTORS
AT A MAJOR ACCOUNTING FIRM
This table lists the top 19 out of 122 factors included on a survey of audit seniors who had been
identified as successful by a major accounting firm. Survey respondents were asked to rate 122 factors
that were identified as possibly contributing success as an auditor in the firm. All ratings were provided
on a five point scale. The averages represent the average of the ratings supplied by all respondents. The
factors considered to be closely related to the topic of this dissertation are shown in bold.

Skill in offering helpful and meaningful suggestions to coworkers/clients

4.7

Ability to work effectively under pressure (e.g., tight deadlines, etc.)

4.6

Ability to organize work and prioritize activities

4.6

Ability to adapt to considerable pressure from deadlines and heavy workload

4.5

Ability to handle several tasks at one time

4.5

Willingness to respond quickly and with a sense of urgency to meet client needs

4.5

Willingness and a flexibility to adjust to multiple demands, shifting priorities, ambiguity,
and rapid change

4.4

Skill in managing own workload, and managing budgets/timetables to maximize
engagement economics

4.4

Willingness to routinely work SO hours or more a week during certain time periods

4.4

Ability to work and get along with client representatives and other [Firm] team members

4.4

Ability to see the "big picture’ in addition to the details of a particular task

43

Willingness to persevere on assigned tasks in the face of obstacles o r "roadblocks"

4.3

Ability to plan work for self and provide guidance to others on a short-term (i.e. daily) basis

4.3

Willingness to demonstrate a commitment to quality and continuous improvement in client
service

4.3

Willingness to assume a leadership role on projects

4.3

Willingness to set high performance standards

4.3

Doing more than the minimum

43

Willingness to do things without being asked

43

Demonstrating a professional image/appearance/demeanor when working with clients

4.3
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APPENDIX B

DOCUMENTATION OF THE PRETESTING PROCESS
This appendix details the nature of each pretest conducted and the major changes made as a result.
The minor changes and the rationale for each of the changes is omitted in the interest of presenting a more
parsimonious account of the process.
Original Instrument:
McDaniel’s written materials were altered m inim ally . The only changes made were to expand the
auditors’ responsibilities to include the detection of irregularities rather thanjust errors. The audit program
related the documentation requirements more explicitly than McDaniel’s did. The data was altered
significantly to include the misstatements of the reserve record. Initially, all of the customers were of equal
size and ten customers contained consistent omissions of overstocked inventory from the reserve (rather
than the two that were ultimately reported erroneously).

Pretest# 1:
Subjects: Ten senior-level or graduate students divided into high and low time pressure conditions.
Results:
*
None of the students noted the consistent reserve item omissions for any of the ten customers.
*

Several noted that the reserve was understated, but that was just due to the excessive number of
exceptions included in the sample (i.e., they sampled one item from many of the customers with
consistent omissions but did not notice systematic nature of the other omissions outside of the
sample).

*

The debriefing process revealed that students were confused by the policy for valuing the reserve.

Alterations of the Instrument:
*
The Inventory Reserve Record was renamed the Reserve for Slow-Moving and Overstocked
Inventory Record. The policy for valuing the reserve was clarified to reflect the effects o f an
omission on inventory and net income.

Pretest #s 2a and 2b:
Subjects: Four and three auditors, respectively, in the low time pressure condition.
Results:
*
The auditors’ performance was essentially the same as the students in pretest # 1 (on the
subsidiary task).
*

Several of these auditors suggested that the policy for valuing the reserve may be overly
restrictive; they believed that there was probably a legitimate reason for the omission of items
from the reserve that was noted in their samples. Discussions with these auditors revealed that
they believed that, by documenting that the sample indicated a material misstatement due to
reserve item omissions, they did not see the need to investigate the area further.

*

They also indicated that the omission of items from the finished goods inventory was confusing
and that they could generate no reasonable explanation for these items.
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Alterations of the Instrument:
*
Based on discussions with these auditors and meetings with two audit partners, statements were
added that:
*

discussed environmental factors (e.g., increased competition, slower inventory turnover,
etc.),

*

established the policy for valuing the reserve as an industry standard, and

*

increased the strength of the wording of the statements emphasizing the dual nature of
the auditor’s task.

*

The number of customers for whom all items were overstocked but omitted from the reserve was
reduced from ten to two. The distribution of customer sizes was changed from a uniform
distribution to one in which there were 35 small customers, 20 medium sized customers, and five
very large customers. The two "red flag* customers were very large customers. This had the
effect of making it relatively unlikely that the samples chosen to execute the detailed tests would
reveal an excessive number of omissions.

*

The number of finished goods omission items was reduced from 8% to 1%. This lowered the
required sample size o f the inventory test count and eliminated the ’ dead end” investigation of the
omissions that were not realistic types of errors and therefore had no plausible explanation. The
reduced sample size for this step allowed ten minutes to be trimmed from the time pressure
conditions.

*

Customer totals were added for the average monthly use and units on hand. This was done to
increase the strength of the psychophysical and collative properties of the cues indicative of
possible irregularities present.

Pretest # 3:
Subjects: Seven auditors in the low time pressure condition.
Results:
♦One auditor detected and documented the situation involving one of the two ’ red flag* customers. It
appeared that this auditor first completed the assigned procedures and then went back and looked for other
things to do. The others did not make any documentation of the situation (although a discussion revealed
that one other auditor saw something unusual but did not pursue it).
*

The changes designed to eliminate the consideration o f finished goods inventory omissions and the
questioning of the policy for valuing the reserve appeared to be successful.
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Alterations of the Instrument:
*
Customer inventory turnover ratios were added to the finished goods inventory record. No
mention of the ratio was made anywhere else on the audit program or in other experimental
materials in order to avoid indicating that audit procedures needed to be executed on these ratios.
*

*

The audit program was altered to emphasize the importance of reviewing for items that appear
unusual during the execution of detailed audit procedures.
*

The way time pressure was communicated was changed by assigning budgeted times for
each audit step. This had the effect of making it clearer earlier whether or not the task
would be completed on time; thus allowing those under low time pressure to operate
under lower arousal earlier. The pretest auditors appeared to be intense during the
execution of procedures and very relaxed in the period after procedures were completed.
They were pressing on throughout because they did not know how long the next
procedure was going to take.

*

The importance of reviewing for unusual items while executing the audit program steps
was emphasized on the audit program. The wording of this statement was consistent with
audit programs used in professional practice.

*

The dual nature of the auditors role was reemphasized in the audit program instructions.

During experimental questionnaires were developed to be used to measure concurrent processing
of the indicators of financial fraud.

Pretest # 4:
Subjects: Two faculty members one under low time pressure and one under undefined time pressure (no
time limit was set for this subject but it was apparent that the task was completed very quickly).
Results:
*
Neither detected the red flags in the data, but one noted several of the indicators present in the
environment.
*

Discussions revealed that the inventory turnover ratio (which was abbreviated ITO in the records
without any legend indicating what ITO stood for) was not clearly understood.

Alterations of the Instrument:
*
The customer subtotals (including ITO ) were place in bold type to strengthen the psychophysical
properties associated with these cues.
*

The language of the red flags in the contextual information was strengthened.

Pretest # 5:
Subject: One auditor in the low time pressure condition.
Results:
*
This auditor noted the low ITO ratios, circled them, and wrote ’ investigate’ next to them but did
not perform any follow-up investigation.
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Alterations to the Instrument:
*
The importance of following-up on any unusual items, customers, products, or amounts was
emphasized in the task instructions and the audit program.
*

An explanation of the ITO was placed on the front page of the inventory records as a note made
by another auditor. The ITO was linked directly to the column headings on the records. It was
emphasized that low levels of the ITO ratio were indicative of a build up o f units on hand relative
to the average monthly usage. This change was made to strengthen the ecological properties of
the ITO cues.

*

Many passages in the written materials were evaluated and adjusted where it was necessary to
clarify ambiguous statements.

Pretest ffs6a and 6b:
Subjects: Four and two auditors, respectively, all in the low time pressure condition except one auditor
in 6a in the high time pressure condition.
Results:
*
Three of the five in the low time pressure condition made some indication that there was
something unusual with the 'red flag* customers. One of these thoroughly documented the
situation linking it to the increased competition.
*

The auditor under high time pressure did nothing other than execute the assigned audit procedures
and made no extra marks on the materials.

Alteration to the Instrument:
*
Some additional questions were added to the post-experimental questionnaire.
Pretest i
f7:
Subjects: Eight graduate students in an advanced auditing class. Six were under low time pressure and
two were under undefined time pressure (although they appeared to rush through it).
Results:
*
Three of the students (all under low time pressure) thoroughly documented the situation involving
the 'red flag’ customers.
Alteration of the Instrument:
*
The description of an additional incentive and opportunity to engage in irregularities was added
to the task instructions.
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APPENDIX C
T E S T IN STR U M EN T
TASK INSTRUCTIONS
Task Requirements
You are assisting in the current year’s inventory work for the University Division of CEA
Co., a large, highly diversified manufacturer who has been audited by your firm for the last four years.
Because of the diversity between the divisions of CEA Co., each has a high degree of autonomy.
Corporate influence comes mainly in the form of financial statement based incentives and resource
allocations. The Division supplies CEA's 60 university customers with 25 different products (e.g.,
sweatshirts running shorts, caps, etc.) that include the individual schools’ logos. You have been
assigned to complete a portion of the Division’s audit of Finished Goods Inventory and the related
Reserve for Slow-moving and Obsolete Inventory. You are to examine the client-prepared records for
certain bookkeeping errors and irregularities and to document your findings within the time allotted.
Any potential errors or irregularities are related to inventory and reserve valuation and
completeness. You have a dual role to play in this task just as you do in actual audit situations. You
have the responsibility to achieve the audit objectives by
*

executing assigned audit procedures as effectively and efficiently as possible and

*

being attentive to any indicators of possible irregularities that may be present in the
data.

Your responsibility for following up on these procedures and documenting the results of these
procedures is the same as it would be in an actual audit situation.
Client and Audit Information
All information needed to conduct your examination is provided either by the client or your
firm’s engagement office. Just as in a normal audit situation, you should study and obtain an
understanding of all information prior to executing the audit procedures. Time has been allocated for
this task in the audit program. You will have the following information:
I.

CEA Co. University Division Records (prepared by client):

(A)

year-end Finished Goods Inventory Record as of 3-31-93 (arranged by customer with average
monthly use, units on hand, and unit cost information for each product code; also reported are
inventory turnover ratios for each customer—labelled ITO on record—and subtotals for each
customer of average monthly usage and units on hand—labelled TOTAL)

(B)

year-end Reserve for Slow-moving and Obsolete Inventory Record as o f 3-31-93.

(C)

catalog list of approved product codes with their current costs. (Different logos do not vary in
cost. Therefore, items with the same product code but different university logos should have
the same unit cost.)

(D)

client statement of CEA’s policy for valuing the Reserve for Slow-moving and Obsolete
Inventory (with auditors’ notes on the policy below).

125
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II.

Audit Materials (prepared by engagement office):

(A)

excerpts from the engagement office’s letter about the UniversityDivision:
(1)
statement o f audit objectives,
(2)
description of the client’s operating environment,
(3)
expected population error rates (by type) based on sample error rates observed by
your firm over the past four years.

(B)

details of work performed (or to be performed) at the Division by other auditors in your firm
(you may rely on this work in your examination):
(1)
year-end inventory test counts,
(2)
audited average monthly usage values (These values are based upon net salesof each
item over the first three quarters of the fiscal year. The audit of these values was
conducted during interim testing procedures.)
(3)
extensions and footings of the inventory and reserve records (to be performed by other
auditors after your examination). Note: the totals of the records listed in I., above,
have been traced to the general ledger (the totals are not provided, however).

(C)

an audit program designed to assist your examination for errors.

Documentation Requirements
In order to accurately evaluate the results of your efforts, it is important to document your
work. Blank columns are provided in the various inventory records to show your work. The audit
program w ill instruct you as to the column in which you should show your work for each particular
audit procedure. For each characteristic of the inventory or reserve item selected for examination,
(1)

circle the item’s characteristic being tested (e.g., circle the selected item’s unit cost),

(2)

indicate the accuracy of the characteristic by marking in the labeled column a check
mark (if the characteristic is correct) or an X (if the characteristic is in error).

Additional space is provided on the right-hand side of each page of the client-prepared
materials for you to document any work done in addition to that required by the audit program or to
document any other situation which you may feel requires further attention. An additional page is also
provided for you to provide more detailed documentation.

Importance of Your Work
Your ability to accurately identify any errors or irregularities in the client's inventory records
is of interest to your supervisors. It is important to work to achieve the stated objectives as accurately
and efficiently as possible.

Questions
Please take a few minutes to review these instructions. If you have any questions, ask them
before we begin the inventory exercise. Once your time begins, no questions can be answered. Your
time w ill begin when you are instructed to open the inventory materials.
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STATEM ENT OF A U D IT OBJECTIVES
For the portion of the inventory audit that you are performing, you have the following two
objectives:
*

To be 90% confident that the true error rate for each error type below does not
exceed the tolerable error rate of 15%. The audit procedures detailed in the audit
program have been designed to allow you to achieve this objective.

*

To reach an overall conclusion as to the reasonableness and the fairness of the items
and amounts presented and disclosed in the financial statements. Your review for
items, amounts, products, and customers that appear unusual (which is to be executed
concurrently with the audit program steps) should allow you to achieve this objective.

To obtain these objectives, you should execute your audit procedures as effectively and efficiently as
possible while being attentive to the possibility that errors or irregularities may exist in the data.
C LIEN T’S OPERATING ENVIRONM ENT
(excerpt from audit planning memo)
The fourth quarter entry of a new, major competitor in the market has affected the demand for
the products of the University Division of CEA Co.. This may have the effect of making it more
difficult to retain existing customers. Our preliminary review of year-end financial information has
indicated that profitability is down and inventory is up. Analytical procedures revealed that aggregate
inventory turnover (ITO) is lower, meaning that the client has had to hold onto its inventory longer.
As a result, the number of units on hand is greater relative to the average monthly usage than it has
been in the past. At this time, it is unclear as to whether this situation is a result of an overall slow
down or a situation involving specific items, products, or customers. We should be attentive to any
detailed data that might provide information on this situation. The inventory area has been identified as
more risky this year than in prior years.
EXPECTED POPULATION ERROR RATES
Over the past four years a number of bookkeeping errors have been detected in this portion of
the year-end audit of inventory and associated reserve for overstocked and slow-moving items for this
CEA Co. Division. All errors relate to valuation and completeness. The table below summarizes the
expected population error rates for the current year's audit based on sample results of the past four
years’ observed frequencies for these types of inventory errors. The samples in the audit program are
designed to achieve the required level of confidence given these expected population error rates.
Expected Population
Assertion
Type of Error
Error Rate
Valuation
Finished Goods Inventory
unit pricing
9%
Reserve for Slow-moving and
Obsolete Inventory unit pricing
Completeness

S%

Finished Goods Inventory
item omission

1%

Reserve for Slow-moving and
Obsolete Inventory item omission

3%
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INVENTORY AUDIT PROGRAM INSTRUCTIONS
You should use this program to assist in your examination for errors and irregularities in the
client’s Finished Goods Inventory and Reserve for Slow-Moving and Obsolete Inventory
Records
While the procedures in this program are designed to provide the appropriate level of
confidence that the true population error rate for each error type does not exceed the tolerable
error rate, you should be attentive to any errors or irregularities that may exist but may not
show up in the sample.
*

Execute the audit procedure of ’ reviewing the records for items, amounts, products,
and customers that appear unusual* as you perform each audit program step.

*

Just as it would be in an actual audit situation, execution of the audit program steps
without being attentive to unusual items would be inappropriate.

Use a ’haphazard” sample selection technique to pick the individual items to be investigated.
For the sampled items, you should be concerned with the frequency and nature of any errors,
rather than direction or monetary effect. You should consider all aspects of any unusual items
noted in your review, however.
Your responsibility for following up on these procedures and documenting the results of these
procedures is the same as it would be in an actual audit situation, given the constraints on the
information available. Please attempt to conduct all follow-up procedures and provide
documentation as you complete each step.
Performance of the audit procedures within the times noted in the ’Time Bud.’ column next to
each audit step will allow you to complete the task within the total time allotted for the audit
task.
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INVENTORY AUDIT PROGRAM
Concurrent with all audit
program steps.

Time
(75 min. total)
Bud
13

14

Review records for items, amounts, products, and customers that appear
unusual. Your initial on any of the other audit program steps indicates that
you have performed such a review.

Initial
Audit Program Step

Act
Study and obtain an understanding of all client information, records, and audit
program steps.
Using the test count sheet from the physical inventory observation procedures
(previously performed by your firm’s auditors), trace each item physically
counted to the units on hand reported in the Finished Goods Inventory.
(Documentation: Circle units on hand. Place a check or an "X" in the
column labelled "FINISHED GOODS OMISSION.")
From each page of the Reserve for Slow-moving and Obsolete Inventory,
select a sample of five items. For each sample item, verify that the per unit
cost agrees with the approved product code-current cost list.

13
(Documentation: Circle unit cost. Place a check or an "X" in the column
labelled "RESERVE PRICING.")
From the Finished Goods Inventory, select one item from 25 o f the 30 pages.
For each sample item, calculate whether the quantity on hand exceeds 3 times
the monthly usage. Any items having in excess of three month’s usage should
be traced to the Reserve to verifv that the excess units are properlv included.
17
(Documentation: Circle the average monthly usage for each item selected.
Place a check or an "X" in the column labelled "RESERVE ITEM
OMISSION." Place an "X" only if
UNITS ON HAND > 3 * AVG MONTHLY USE
AND the item is not included on the reserve)

18

From the Finished Goods Inventory, select three items from each oddnumbered page and two items from each even-numbered page. For each
sample item, verify that the recorded per unit cost agrees with the approved
product code-current cost list.
(Documentation: Circle unit cost. Place a check or an "X" in the column
labelled "FINISHED GOODS PRICING.")
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PO LICY FOR VALUING TH E RESERVE FOR
SLOW -M OVING AND OBSOLETE INVENTORY
In order to show its inventory at the lower of cost or market, CEA Co. determines the value
of its year-end inventory at each division by reducing the total book value of Finished Goods Inventory
by the total Reserve for Slow-Moving and Obsolete Inventory value. An entry is recorded in the
Reserve for any finished goods inventory item whose quantity on hand exceeds 3 times its average
monthly usage. The EXCESS quantity (i.e., supply greater than 3 months usage) is to be recorded on
the Reserve for Slow-moving and Obsolete Inventory at the current unit cost.
(For example: Suppose a particular item in the Finished Goods Inventory reports 90 units on hand with
an average monthly usage of 25 units and a current cost of $2 per unit. The Reserve for Slow-moving
and Obsolete Inventory should include a corresponding entry for EXCESS quantity of 15 units [90 - (25
x 3)] at the item’s $2 unit cost.)
Auditor’s Notes on Client Policy
The following entry should be made in the inventory records to establish the reserve for the above
example:
Holding Loss
Reserve for Slow-moving & Obsolete
Inventory (logo num, prod code)

30 < = = Income Statement
30 < = =Contra-asset

Similar entries should be made for all other items whose quantity on hand exceeds three times the
average monthly usage. The division’s chief financial officer initiates and authorizes the recording of
these entries based upon a review of inventory records. The reserve record displays all of the items for
which such an entry was made at year-end.
This method of valuing inventory is very well established and accepted in the industry. A ll o f CEA
Co.’s major competitors use this method of establishing the reserve for slow-moving and obsolete
items. Deviations from this policy would affect the comparability of CEA Co.’s financial statements to
those of its competitors.
APPROVED PRODUCT CODES AND U N IT COSTS LIST (as of 3/31/93)
(Prepared by Client) (Verified by Auditors)

D CODE
A
B
C
D
E
F
G
H
I
J
K
L
M

UNIT COST ($)
8.42
9.24
7.13
4.36
4.08
6.82
1.34
5.68
2.49
8.30
3.94
4.64
5.61

PROD CODE

U N IT COST($)

N
O
P
Q
R
S
T
U
V
w
X
Y
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7.49
7.30
9.24
7.72
8.49
8.13
2.15
9.18
9.54
9.37
1.66
7.39

APPENDIX D

SUMMARY OF DIFFERENCES BETWEEN MCDANIEL'S AND THE
DISSERTATION'S TEST INSTRUMENTS
Area of change

McDaniel’s study

Dissertation

Auditor
Responsibility

Auditors were required
to execute the test of
details task. With no
interpretation o f results.

Auditors were required to be attentive to any unusual
items requiring additional investigation while
executing the audit test o f details task. They were
informed that their responsibility to follow up on the
procedures and document the results o f the
procedures was the same as it would be in a normal
audit situation.

Red Flags

None. The errors
seeded in this task were
random pricing
transposition errors,
random omissions from
the reserve, and random
omission from the
finished goods inventory
records.

Indicators consisted of environmental or contextual
factors and task data factors. The following
environmental or contextual factors were present: 1)
the inventory turnover ratio for the division was
lower than in previous years, 2) the total inventory
was quite high, 3) division profitability was low, 4)
competition for the division’s customers was
increasing, 5) the division may have difficulty in
retaining customers, 6) the overall riskiness of the
inventory area was assessed to be quite high, 7)
there was centralized authority w ith in the division,
and 8) the division was an autonomous unit in a
highly diversified company which distributed
resources and incentives based on financial
statements.
The task data indicators consisted of frequent and
systematic omissions from the reserve for the two
largest customers of the division. The task data was
also altered by reducing the number o f omissions
from the finished goods record to reduce confusion
about apparently unexplainable errors.

Client policies
and procedures

Explained policy for
establishing the reserve
inventory.

The title o f the inventory reserve listing was changed
to ’ Reserve for Slow Moving and Obsolete
Inventory* to be more descriptive. The policy for
establishing an item on the reserve was more clearly
explained to allow auditors to realize the financial
statement effects of omissions from the reserve. The
policy was described as being well established within
the industry and vital for the comparability of
financial statements.
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APPENDIX E

SAMPLE EXPERIMENTAL QUESTIONNAIRE
Based on the data you have reviewed and your auditing judgment, what is the likelihood that:
a)

there is a material misstatement involving the omission of items from the Finished Goods
Inventory Record?

1

2

3

4

5

6

remotely
likely

7
very
likely

Have not begun investigation of this area_____
b)

there is a material misstatement involving the omission of items from the Reserve for Slowmoving and Obsolete Inventory Record

1

2

3

4

5

6

remotely
likely

7
very
likely

Have not begun investigation of this area_____
c)

there is a material misstatement involving the pricing of the units in the Reserve for Slowmoving and Obsolete Inventory Record

1

2

3

4

5

6

remotely
likely

7
very
likely

Have not begun investigation of this area_____
d)

there is a material misstatement involving the pricing of the units in Finished Goods Inventory

1

2

3

4

5

6

remotely
likely

7
very
likely

Have not begun investigation of this area_____
e)

there are irregularities (intentional misstatements) present in the data

1

2

3

4

5

6

remotely
likely
f)

7
very
likely

financial reporting fraud (intentionally misleading financial statements) is present

1

2

3

4

5

remotely
likely

6

7
very
likely
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APPENDIX F

PARTICIPANT AUDITOR DOCUMENTATION OF
THE RED FLAGS
Subject # OS:

Time Allotted: 65 minutes
Reported Time Taken: 41 minutes
Detection Performance:
First measurement (notice anything unusual): Detected
Wrote ’ Obsolete?* next to the low inventory turnover ratio for one of the two
potentially misstated customers.
Second measurement (understand misstatement): Not Detected

Subject # 56:
Time Allotted: 55 minutes
Reported Time Taken: 46 minutes
Detection Performance:
First measurement (notice anything unusual): Detected
Circled the inventory turnover ratio and wrote ’ Very low! * next to it for both of the
two potentially misstated customers.
Second measurement (understand misstatement): Not Detected
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Subject # 58:

Time Allotted: 75 minutes
Reported Time Taken: 57 minutes
Detection Performance:
First measurement (notice anything unusual): Detected
Second measurement (understand misstatement): Detected
On the Additional Documentation page this auditor wrote, ’ Inventory turnover rate for Univ. logo #s
108 and 148 are low in relation to other customers. Possible obsolescence issue in addition to amounts
already recorded.’
In the Post Experimental Questionnaire, this auditor identified the low inventory turnover ratios for the
two customers and indicated that there should be an independent calculation of the reserve amount.
Subject # 62:
Time Allotted: 75 minutes
Reported Time Taken: 72 minutes
Detection Performance:
First measurement (notice anything unusual): Detected
Second measurement (understand misstatement): Detected
On the Finished Goods Inventory Record next to customer number 148 this auditor wrote, ’ Additional
testing done on LOGO 148 due to large quantities on hand.’ Several calculations were included next to
this customer indicating that this auditor had generated an estimate of the amount o f the misstatement of
the reserve. These calculations indicated that there was a 32,236 unit excess resulting in a possible
$219,746 adjustment of the reserve.
These calculations were elaborated upon on the Additional Documentation page in which the comment
was made, ’ It looks as if several items in LOGO 148 & 108 have been left off of the reserve listing
(see low ITOs). Approximate misstatement = $200,000 in logo 148. We should have client compute
actual amount of misstatement and propose adjusting JE to correct. Number of errors indicates results
will exceed tolerable error rate of 15%.
The audit program indicated that this auditor spent over 45 % of the total time on the reserve item
omission step. An exit interview confirmed that the analysis of the reserve item omission was done
during the execution of the audit step which led to the discovery.
The two customers were identified again in the Post Experimental Questionnaire.
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Subject # 22:

Time Allotted: 75 minutes
Reported Time Taken: 53
Detection Performance:
First measurement (notice anything unusual): Detected
Second measurement (understand misstatement): Detected
Next to both of the potentially misstated customers, this subject wrote, "Most of these items require a
reserve."
On the Additional Documentation page this subject wrote, "Did a review o f average monthly usage and
total units on hand. Noted logo numbers 112 and 117 are over reserved and very few of these appear
on the slow moving and obsolete sheet Thus, reserve may be misstated." This was the only note
appearing on this page.
The initial detection of the items appeared to occur during the execution of the audit steps. The
additional documentation was done during the last ten minutes of the task (as indicated by writing
utensil color).
Subject # 26:
Time Allotted: 75 minutes
Reported Time Taken: 69
Detection Performance:
First measurement (notice anything unusual): Detected
Second measurement (understand misstatement): Detected
For one of the two potentially misstated customers, the "Reserve Item Omission’ column contained Xs
nest to each of the items improperly excluded from the reserve. In the comments area next to this
customer was the comment "Not on reserve listing" for each item with an X . The writing utensil color
indicated that this analysis was done concurrent with the execution of the audit program step.
On the Additional Documentation page were the following comments:
"It is questionable whether we can rely on the clients FG inventory listing for amt. extensions as there
are numerous occasions where the improper unit cost was used. Also we need to follow up on why our
test count was diff. that the listing—may indicate that we can’t rely on the listing at all."
"The reserve calculation for slow/obsolete w ill need to be redone. First, some items are
inappropriately excluded. Second, amts (per unit cost) are incorrect Third, FG listing is suspect (see
above)."
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APPENDIX G
O P T IM A L DOCUM ENTATION OF TH E RED FLAGS
"O p tim a l*

Documentation

There appears to be a material misstatement with regard to the completeness assertion for the
Reserve for Slow-Moving and Obsolete Inventory. Based on the audit procedures applied thus far, the
misstatement appears to be intentional and quite possibly an instance of financial fraud. The support
for these conclusions is outlined below.
The units on hand for all products for the customers numbered 108 and 148 are in excess of
three times the average monthly usage. Only an average number of products for these two customers
are reported on the inventory reserve listing (approximately five for each customer out of 25 that
should be on the reserve). Given the explicit language about the policy for valuing the reserve (that
deviations from the policy of including on the reserve all items with an excess of three times the
average monthly usage would affect comparability of the financial statements), the financial statements
are, at a m in im u m , materially misstated.
It should be noted that it is possible that large sales occurring just prior to year-end may have
gone unrecorded, thus reducing the likelihood that the misstatement is due to irregularity. The followup investigation should include procedures to determine whether that is the case. Because of the
significance of such a transaction, should it be proposed to exist, the auditors should be highly skeptical
o f any evidence provided and should take special care to ensure that the timing of the reduction on the
inventory coincided with the recognition o f the sale. The following discussion details why it is more
likely that the misstatement is a result of financial fraud rather than a failure to record large sales.
First, it is clear that the following incentives to commit financial fraud are present in the
environment:
*

The University Division is operating under corporate financial statement based incentives and
resource allocations.

*

Competition is increasing with the fourth quarter entry o f a new, major competitor.

*

The new competition may make it difficult to retain existing customers.

*

Profitability is down. Note that this is especially relevant given that incentives and resource
allocations are based on the financial statements.

The following are opportunities to commit financial fraud:
*

The University Division is fairly autonomous.

*

The diversity of the corporation may make it difficult to closely monitor the Division.

*

The Division’s CFO initiates and authorizes the recording of items on the inventory reserve
record. It seems unusual that a task which should be routine is given to such a high ranking
official who is most likely not subject to review.
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The following points highlight some of the reasons why the potential financial fraud may have
perpetrated:
*

The failure to make the entry to record items on the reserve has the effect of overstating net
income and total assets, two factors which are probable bases for financial statement based
incentives.

*

The two customers in question are two of the company’s five largest customers.

*

The fact that the number of units on hand is in excess of three times the average monthly
usage for all products may indicate that the client is not selling to these two customers. That
is, they may have lost these customers. The size and timing of the overstatements indicate that
the loss of these customers may have occurred in the fourth quarter.

*

The average monthly usage values were audited during interim testing procedures based on
sales over the first three quarters of the fiscal year. These procedures would not be sensitive
to the loss of customers occurring during the fourth quarter.

*

The sizes of the two potentially lost customers may make it difficult for the Division to stay in
business. Leaving the excesses off of the reserve may have been an attempt to conceal a
potential going concern problem from the auditors and others.

Recommendation:
It is recommended that for the customers in question (and possibly the other three large
customers) an extensive review of fourth quarter sales for the year under audit and first quarter sales
for the subsequent year should be undertaken. This review should incorporate the analysis of sales
invoices and cash receipts with a very high level of skepticism to determine if goods are currently being
sold to these customers. If the client can produce apparently appropriate documents for these
customers, independent confirmation with the customer o f the representations included therein should
be considered. If these audit procedures lead to the conclusion that these customers have been lost and
that the goods are obsolete, the matter should be communicated to the audit committee as a likely
financial fraud. In light of the new information on the integrity of management, the scope of the entire
audit should be reevaluated with special attention given to evidence obtained through inquiry of top
management.
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